India8217;s best option

Trends in Indian military research and development spending indicate that resources will be available to pursue naval nuclear propulsion and cruise missile development seriously over the coming decade if they are given sufficient priority. The draft nuclear doctrine prepared for the Indian government following the May 1998 nuclear tests calls for a naval component of its nuclear weapons delivery systems.

Neither the air nor land-based components of the proposed nuclear quot;triadquot; will evolve global reach under India8217;s official and common sense policy of quot;no first usequot; of nuclear weapons. For instance, the so-called intercontinental ballistic missiles ICBMs in the hands of the United States and Russia are really me-ant to just arc briefly over the Arctic Oc-ean. They are not meant to fly all the way around the globe. Nor is India likely to see a need for stealth bombers that can circumnavigate the globe.

On the naval side, there is talk of deploying nuclear-capable missiles on surface vessels. But these vessels can8217;t be relied upon to survive a confrontation with comparable or larger nuclear forces under a quot;no first usequot; do- ctrine. Nuclear-armed submarines would thus be necessary in practice for acquiring global reach.

The purpose here is not to address whether or not such developments are desirable. Rather it is to examine how and when they might occur. It would be peculiar if India or any other state made large investments in the 21st century in ballistic missile submarines SSBNs. Despite their importance during the Cold War, these monsters are rapidly becoming an obsolete technology. SSBNs were designed before the maturation of cruise missile technology, and when potential adversaries were presumed to have effective air defence systems.

Cruise missiles have relatively cheap air-breathing engines but guidance systems that are sophisticated and within India8217;s rapidly developing computer software capabilities. By no wit is it politically possible for any modern state to accomplish a full-scale trial run of an air defence system to intercept waves of incoming cruise missiles. Americans would prefer to hide behind the illusion of security provided by constructing defence against ballistic rather than cruise missiles. Most other states have almost given up the idea of effective missile defence altogether.

In comparison to nuclear-powered attack submarines equipped with cruise missiles, concentrating on special purpose SSBNs would have many disadvantages for any country8217;s future expansion or even maintenance of nuclear delivery capability. Designed to hide underwater with enough explosive power in one place to destroy an entire country, SSBNs lack the political and operational flexibility of conventional or nuclear-powered attack submarines. While the SSBN route can8217;t be totally ruled out, these obvious considerations are unlikely to be lost on Indian military planners.

It is interesting to note that the increase in resources available to the Indian Navy is likely to exceed Rs 10,000 crore per year sometime in the 2010-2020 time frame. Exactly when there is this ki-nd of increase depends on the overall economic development trend, whether military spending gravitates towards recent levels of about 2.4 per cent of GDP or moves back towards its 30-year average of just under 3 per cent, and whether the Navy continues to capture about 14 per cent of the defence budget.

Assuming the country prioritises its research, development and procurement in line with such objectives, by 2010-2020 it should be able to begin to field a fleet of dual-use nuclear-powered submarines and cruise missiles with increasing domestic technology complement.

Projections indicate that India has the economic and technical capability to acquire global reach around the 2010-2020 time frame. This is consistent with the draft nuclear doctrine submitted to the government. If India pursues the politically and technically riskier and arguably obsolete technology of ballistic missile submarines, or otherwise gets hung up due to lack of clarity on policy choices, then its global reach could be delayed until 2020 or 2030. Either way, India will view itself as having the capacity to achieve global reach sometime after about 2010, and will view its role in progress towards global management of nuclear weapons capabilities accordingly.

Substantive progress towards comprehensive global management of nuclear weapons capabilities awaits resolution of the impasse on the US-Russian Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties ST-ART II and III before those countries can seriously engage the rest of the world. Completion of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty FMCT on new production of pl-utonium and uranium for nuclear wea-pons is also probably essential, but this will have to wait until Pakistan has produced enough fissile material to unblock it.

Only then can a serious dialogue on existing stocks begin. And by this time, India is reasonably likely to be committed to a weaponisation programme that potentially has global reach.

India cannot be engaged within the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty NPT. Neither will other nations allow that treaty to be completely ignored. Thus, a process will need to be invented that avoids the NPT and engages an India that sees itself with global reach potential. That India8217;s potential for global nuclear reach should make it an inescapable player in global nuclear arms control negotiations is obvious in India. However, it will be a while before the Americans fully absorb the implications of this.

The challenge will be to craft cooperative approaches that accommodate the apparent contradiction between India8217;s insistence on a time-bound framework for the elimination of nuclear weapons and others8217; instinctive reaction against committing to a rigid time frame for the professed goal of elimination of nuclear weapons.

The writer is professor of nuclear engineering and director of arms control, disarmament and international security program at the University of Illinois, USA