Hindi-Chini, by and by

Seen in the context of Singh and Wen8217;s meeting on the sidelines of the East Asia summit on November 21, these decisive steps indicate India8217;s desire to go with substance than the packaging of India-China bilateral relations. At the Singapore meeting, Wen said India should be prepared to give substantial concessions in the eastern and western sectors on the Line of Actual Control LAC to resolve the boundary issue and sought RTA with India as well as market economy status for China. Though Singh made it clear that he had across-the-board political backing in India to sort out the boundary dispute, Wen indicated that Beijing wanted to move away from the mutually agreed political parameters to resolve the boundary issue in April 2005.

If diplomacy is a game of perceptions, then the India-China relationship is all about power projections. It is instructive to note that China agreed to political parameters for resolution of the boundary issues after the Indian leadership put its best foot forward and led the relief effort in the wake of the December 2004 tsunami. Once Sri Lanka and the Maldives requested India for help, it moved its navy with relief before even the US. It was only after Beijing read the Indian tsunami initiative and capability in the global context that it decided to move ahead on the boundary issue.

It is very important for the PM to get the Chinese to reaffirm the political parameters as well as convince his counterpart on the need to add substance to the relationship given that the two countries choose to be strategic partners. The Indians must convince their Chinese interlocutors to move fast on the LAC by exchanging maps of western and eastern sectors through the revival of the virtually defunct joint working group as aggressive manoeuvres by Beijing on the disputed borders has the potential of disturbing the peace and tranquility pact. This will give New Delhi the requisite confidence to give a strategic dimension to its largely bilateral ties with Beijing.

The fact is, the Chinese leadership does not consider India its rival. Aggressive statements of its junior diplomats from time to time are indicative of this so-called superior mindset. Yet, Beijing has no option but to improve ties with India as the latter8217;s rise is seen to be benign, particularly by the West. This is contrary to Western concerns over the rise of China on the global stage. So willy-nilly, it is in Beijing8217;s interest to add substance to the ties as a resurgent India that is close to the West could be a constraint to Chinese moves on the global stage.

It is important that the PM give out the message that New Delhi would like to be treated as a strategic partner on equal footing with Beijing and one that is even prepared to share its candid assessment of the South Asian neighbourhood with the Chinese leadership. Singh should discuss the turmoil in Pakistan and the rise of fundamentalist forces in Bangladesh candidly with Wen in the context of promoting peace and stability in South Asia.

New Delhi, on its part, must not single out Chinese FDI in India on security grounds and convey so to Beijing. Some sectors that are crucial for India8217;s security interests should be earmarked for Indian companies but the rest be kept open to all.

China too must respond to suspicion in India. This draws upon China8217;s attitude on issues vital to Indian interests, like UN reform, waiver to the Indo-US nuclear deal at the NSG and continued hardware supply to Pakistan.

Though the UPA government is seen as weak by the Chinese leadership, with some parties inadvertently acting as proxies of Beijing, the PM must be polite yet firm in dealing with his interlocutors next week. There are clear-cut lessons to be drawn on Beijing8217;s psyche from the April 1987 Sumdorong Chu valley incident that nearly led to an India-China border confrontation in Arunachal Pradesh. In June 1986, Indian security forces noticed that Chinese troops had crossed the McMohan Line into Sumdorong Chu valley in the Thag La ridge area and set up a helipad and border posts. When New Delhi protested, Beijing was aggressive and communicated that it was part of its border management strategy. But it was the decisive leadership of then army chief, General K. Sundarji, that saved the situation for India. Sundarji airlifted an entire brigade of troops to unoccupied positions overlooking the Chinese incursions without asking the government and in support of his ground troops later that year. This move, called Operation Falcon, had the Chinese fuming with Deng Xiaoping openly declaring his intention to teach India a lesson in early 1987. The confrontation never took place and both India and China withdrew to their respective original positions with Beijing silently admiring the Indian audacity. This led to the setting up of a joint working group on LAC clarifications and paved the way for then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi8217;s visit to China the next year.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh must remember that if you are not at the table with the Chinese then you are likely to be on their menu.

shishir.guptaexpressindia.com