Executive dunnit

The doctrine of separation of powers rises from Montesquieu8217;s theory of checks and balances. In Jharkhand as in Goa, wasn8217;t it the executive 8212; whether governor or chief minister 8212; using a compliant presiding officer to impose his will on the House? If the 8220;delicate balance8221; was disturbed 8212; and I agree it was 8212; wasn8217;t it a case of the Supreme Court checking the executive to preserve legislative freedom? In truth, the apex court repeatedly expressed its reluctance to step in.

On July 28, 1993, the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha bailed out the Narasimha Rao ministry in a

No-Confidence Motion. The CBI found evidence of bribery. Four MPs 8212; Shibu Soren, Suraj Mandal, Simon Marandi, and Shailendra Mahato who turned approver 8212; were named, along with several Congress and Janata Dal Ajit members. The Supreme Court let them off, hoping Parliament would discipline its own. Which speaker of the Lok Sabha has initiated such a debate?

This wasn8217;t the only case of the Supreme Court8217;s confidence in the legislatures. In March 1964, the Uttar Pradesh Assembly jailed Keshav Singh for contempt of the House. The Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court gave him bail. Speaker Madan Mohan Varma then ordered both judges jailed. The full bench of the Allahabad High Court prohibited implementation of the speaker8217;s edict. The Supreme Court, to whom President Radhakrishnan referred the issue, observed, 8220;In a modern State it is often necessary for the good of the country that parallel powers should exist in different authorities. It is not inevitable that such powers will clash.8221;

There was a rider. 8220;During the fourteen years that the Constitution has been in operation, the legislature have not done anything to justify the view that they do not deserve to be trusted with power.8221; The question of what might happen if legislators proved undeserving wasn8217;t answered. In those innocent times, it was perhaps thought unnecessary. Which presiding officer has codified the privileges of the legislature?

Three years later, in 1967, no party enjoyed a majority in West Bengal. Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee defected from the Congress, joining the Marxists in the United Front. Governor Dharam Vira dismissed the coalition ministry, and Dr P.C. Ghosh took office. Speaker Bejoy Kumar Banerjee refused to recognise the Progressive Democratic Alliance, ruling it was the exclusive power of the House to make and unmake ministries. The P.C. Ghosh ministry resigned.

Speaker Bannerjee became the toast of the chatterati. Even if it meant a spectacularly decrepit regime where Chief Minister Mukherjee sat on dharna outside Writers8217; Building against his own government! Granted that the governor had no right to dismiss a ministry enjoying the House8217;s confidence, could a speaker arbitrarily refuse to recognise ministers?

The question returned to haunt Tamil Nadu in 1972 when the AIADMK broke away from the ruling DMK. Speaker K.A. Mathiazhagan backed the MGR wing. The DMK pushed for his removal but Mathiazhagan refused to take notice of anything it said. It ended in a farcical situation where Deputy Speaker P. Sreenivasan sat in the speaker8217;s lap to conduct proceedings!

Goa and Jharkhand were in the best traditions of this theatre of the absurd. Speaker Vishwas Satarkar disqualified an MLA to save the BJP-led ministry. Speaker Pro-tem Francisco Sardinha proved just as petty as his predecessor. But it was left to Pradeep Kumar Balmuchu to take desecration of democracy to new depths 8212; the speaker pro-tem of Jharkhand disqualified himself from conducting a vote of confidence, piously quoting the Lok Sabha Speaker as he did so!

When the presiding officers are blatantly partisan, who but the judiciary can redress the balance? The courts have forgiven errors all too long. Manipur Speaker Dr H. Borobabu Singh was even pardoned his open defiance of the Supreme Court. The presiding officer is the servant of the House. In the cases cited above, the speaker8217;s purpose seemed to be furthering a particular political plank, not giving the House free expression.

In 1964 and 1992, the judiciary intervened to protect third parties 8212; Keshav Singh in Uttar Pradesh, Manilal Singh in Manipur 8212; from the wrath of a speaker. In Jharkhand, their Lordships stepped in to adjudicate a fight between rival legislators themselves. The struggle isn8217;t between legislature and judiciary, it is a civil war, fostered by the executive, within the legislative wing.

Speaker William Lenthall8217;s observation that he had 8220;neither eyes to see nor tongue to speak in this place but as this House is pleased to direct me8221; is famous. Less well known is the Dunning resolution of 1780 that 8220;the influence of the Crown has increased, is increasing and ought to be diminished8221;. Substitute 8216;8216;Crown8217;8217; for 8216;8216;executive8217;8217;, and here, Mr. Speaker, is a graver issue to discuss with your fellow presiding officers.