Careless in Assam

The explosion at the Indian Oil Corporation depot in Assam points to serious shortcomings in the security set-up at vital installations. ...

The explosion at the Indian Oil Corporation depot in Assam points to serious shortcomings in the security set-up at vital installations. If, as reported, it was the handiwork of ULFA militants, the IOC, the Assam government and anti-terrorist Unified Command of army, paramilitary and police forces should be asking themselves a number of questions. One would expect major oil installations to be physically and electronically guarded round the clock at all times. The Thekeraguri depot which stands at a major rail and road junction appears to have taken the additional precaution of hiring private security guards. One must ask therefore how terrorists gained entry or managed to get near enough to place bombs which caused damage worth Rs 40 crore. Not to have foreseen something like this in militant-ridden Assam in the run-up to Independence Day which is the preferred time for violent action suggests an unacceptable degree of carelessness. It also raises concerns about other, less easily protected, targets ofterrorist violence.

Many of the indications until now were that ULFA8217;s back was being broken thanks to the coordinated efforts of various government agencies since 1997. Several leaders and cadres have been caught or have surrendered, a large number as recently as July. More information about the outfit and the deployment of its human and material resources has been obtained. Its sources of funds could be drying up. As ULFA8217;s popularity among the people has declined, new recruitment to its ranks has fallen. Prafulla Mahanta8217;s government is said to be cooperating closely in various facets of anti-insurgency operations. These are positive and encouraging developments suggesting far more progress than hitherto at all levels, including the political, to contain violence.

Nevertheless, the battle is far from over. Apart from plugging more gaps in security arrangements, the authorities ought to consider some other factors. Hit-and-run operations, as the name suggests, can be carried on effectively by relativelysmall, scattered militant groups. The fact that ULFA8217;s numbers are being depleted does not necessarily mean its capacity to inflict injury is curtailed to the same extent. It obviously does not take large numbers to penetrate weak security at government establishments or to terrorise remote villages. Extremists with their backs to the wall have been known to be more vicious and cunning than those on the ascendant. Moreover, if ULFA8217;s leadership is in disarray, as some claim, the Unified Command should be prepared to encounter an even more unpredictable and arbitrary series of incidents in the coming days and months. In the light of some recent events, the possibility of quot;surrenderedquot; militants regrouping under a new leadership and with somewhat different aims also needs to be examined. Perhaps not enough action has been taken in tandem with the governments of Bhutan, Bangladesh and Myanmar to close down camps and deny extremists new sanctuaries in those countries. Something clearly is being done to counterterrorism. But much more will be needed before public confidence returns.