Break free from a segmented mindset

It is also held that the role of the armed forces in the national power structure was reduced from British times, when the Commander-in-Chief rankedimmediately below the Viceroy. While one would accept the argument that the separation of the service headquarters from the ministry, compartmentalising of defence planning and separating the civil from the military establishment was a bad move functionally and politically, harking back to the British system is irrelevant. The Indian Army under an English Commander-in-Chief was an instrument to preserve imperial rule.

The present-day Indian Army is a national army responsible for the protection of the nation state. It is the army of a people committed to democracy and its attendant constitutional and institutional arrangements. The military high command of our armed forces is subject to civilian authority as in other established democracies.

The second criticism is that the professional competence and morale of our armed forces has been steadily eroded due to bureaucratic insensitivity, ignorance and interference. The third criticism is that the defence ministry, as the department responsible for higherdefence planning, did not have institutional arrangements for the flow of expert military advice to the defence minister and through him to the Cabinet.

Both criticisms are valid. Two reasons for this have been the separation of service headquarters from the ministry and the functions of operational Commander-in-Chief not being separated from the respon- sibilities of higher str-ategic planning and military command. These should have been the responsibility of the office of a Chief of Defence Staff in the defence ministry.

Fernandes has said he will finalise plans for the integration of the services headquarters with the ministry by the end of this month. Proposals are also being prepared in the defence ministry on the basis of previous recommendations for such integration by the three service headquarters.

This proposed reorganisation is a complex process which should not be undertaken for cosmetic purposes. It should be functionally effective and organisationally durable. One hopes the reorganisationwill not be done in a rush inside of a month, and will be done after consulting experts. One hopes the restructuring of the ministry will be completed instead within the year.

The restructuring should be based on consultations with former service chiefs. The three service headquarters and the defence ministry should be completely integrated into one department or ministry. The creation of a Chief of Defence Staff and his secretariat, with a fixed tenure of five years within the ministry, should be considered. The post of Chief of Defence Staff should be rotated between the three service chiefs.

Procedurally the occupant of this post should be stepping up from the position of chief of one of the three services. The Commander-in-Chief, or the Opera-tional Chief Comma-nders of the three services, should be made separately responsible for operational tasks. This office of the Chief of Defence Staff may consist of a Chief of Defence Staff and a separate group of principal staff officers of the rank of lt.general or its equivalent, assisting the Chief of Defence Staff.

To avoid controversies about rank, precedence and competition for status between civilian and armed forces high command, secretaries whose responsibilities impinge on defence matters should be given a rank equivalent to the service chiefs. The cabinet secretary, principal secretary to the prime minister, defence secretary, foreign secretary, home secretary and finance secretary should be declared principal secretaries to the government. While the Chief of Defence Staff should be the principal adviser to the defence minister on military matters, the defence secretary should be the principal adviser on civilian aspects of defence.

The staffing pattern of the ministry should change across the board, with civilian and military officers manning all bureaus and departments, down the line with parallel administrative, financial responsibilities on the civilian side, technical, professional and operational responsibilities on the military side. Thecivilian side being entirely staffed by IAS officers on temporary assignments should stop.

The ministry8217;s civilian side should be manned by select IAS officers on long-term assignment in the ministry, IFS officers, financial and scientific experts with knowledge of defence and strategic matters, and strategic and security experts. Institutional and functional arrangements should be recast to give primacy to technical, professional and man-management advice coming from the military officers of the integrated ministry.

Procedural arrangements should be institutionalised for interaction between senior civilian officers and the office of the Chief of Defence Staff, so that defence planning is not subject to turf battles. There should always be a separate defence minister instead of somebody else holding concurrent charge.

The defence minister should ensure a cooperative interface between the civilian and military sides. Needless to say, the Chief of Defence Staff, the defence secretary and the defenceminister should have regular meetings with the prime minister and briefing sessions with the Cabinet Committee on National Security the present National Security Council. All this is procedurally complex but even more it involves a qualitative change in the mindset, particularly of the political and civil side of our power structure.