
The recent standoff concerning the top defence postings and appointments is the cumulative effect of the manner in which sensitive matters relating to the three services have been handled over the years. The Navy Chief, Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat, cocking a snook at the government over the appointment of a principal staff officer PSO is the most serious fallout of this. Another government decision involving the appointment of the Eastern Army Commander, Lt. Gen. H.R.S. Kalkat, having been reversed by the Delhi High Court in favour of the appellant officer, Lt. Gen. R.S. Kadyan, further underlines the rot that has set in at higher levels. The stay on the Delhi High Court order by the Supreme Court in the case does not end the government8217;s predicament.
Though such awkward situations have arisen in past, they are somewhat rare. Way back in the late 8217;50s, the then Army Chief, Gen K.S. Thimayya, had submitted his resignation following differences with the then Defence Minister, Krishna Menon, over various issues,including Army promotions. Gen. Thimayya had to be persuaded by Pandit Nehru to take back his resignation. On Gen. Thimayya8217;s retirement when Gen. P.N. Thapar took over as the Chief of Army Staff, certain officers were appointed to key military posts without consulting him. All this was ominous for the morale of the officer cadre.
Rumblings against the ministry of defence or the service chiefs over promotions and appointments to key posts have been heard for some years now but apparently the government did not think it appropriate to institutionalise the system. Certain ambiguities in the system have now come to the fore, as the contradicting stands taken by MOD and Admiral Bhagwat indicate.
The manner in which Mulayam Singh Yadav, as defence minister, promoted certain Army officers despite the Army boards not having cleared them for promotion, is well known. Similarly, more than one former defence secretary have been known to promote the narrow interests of their relatives in the services. Similarly, inthe past some of the service chiefs have not only being pursuing their personal agenda but bending rules to suit their own whims and fancies.
Though the affected individual officers would blame one party or another, the fault really lies in the efficacy of the present system, which calls for an overhaul. A service grievance redressal system for defence personnel should be institutionalised so that it can replace the present system of filing statutory and non-statutory complaints, which usually leaves most officers dissatisfied.
There is also too much unnecessary secrecy in higher defence appointments. The answer lies in making the whole promotion and appointment system more transparent so that manipulations and arbitrary functioning are checkmated. One can take a cue from the US, where most senior appointments are open to debate and discussion before they are formalised.
The basic fault of course lies in the manner in which the government has treated the defence services. Such problems would neverhave arisen if an institution like the National Security Council with a Chief of Defence Staff were put in place soon after independence. But till such time this is done, all higher appointments in the services corps commanders and above and their equivalent in the other two services could be discussed at an appropriate forum 8211; perhaps the Standing Committee of Defence of Parliament. This could include even appointment of service chiefs, particularly supersessions, which usually remain unexplained.
Since the three service headquarters too have been over-indulging in ad-hocism and arbitrariness, they can8217;t absolve themselves of the blame. In service matters, new modes and procedure have been tried without adequate deliberation. The Air Force resorted to deep selection8217; system, which left a major chunk of its officer-cadre disgruntled. The discriminatory manner in which the pay scales were sought to be revised in the Air Force last year invited an unprecedented backlash, which had been building up in itsrank and file over the years. Similarly, a few years ago the Army picked on the command and staff stream8217; system, which made its senior commanders uneasy. The stipulations of minimum command tenure on officers for promotion to higher ranks in the Army have resulted in much scowling. Many have taken recourse to legal action. The fact that many of these experiments had to be given up often to be introduced again shows muddled thinking both at the service headquarters and the government levels.
Unfortunately, such wayward functioning has become the order of the day. The recent decision to extend the age of all central government employees is one recent example. How this could be introduced in the three defence services without deliberation is inconceivable. The three services are still in the process of absorbing the aftereffects of government8217;s benevolence.
The current bout of tension at the higher echelons of the government underlines the need for superior military leadership, besides emphasising theneed to address the ticklish issue of civil-military relations. Way back in 1986, Lt. Gen. Dr. M.L. Chibber Retd had written an extremely perceptive book Military Leadership to Prevent Military Coup, in which dwelt at length on the deteriorating civil-military relations. Unfortunately, the advice appears to have gone unheeded.