Baghdad146;s baton

At one level, it was prudent for the US-led Coalition Provision Authority CPA to hand over power to the Iraqis two days before the schedul...

At one level, it was prudent for the US-led Coalition Provision Authority CPA to hand over power to the Iraqis two days before the scheduled June 30 deadline, thus pre-empting the risk of resistance attacks at the time of the transfer of political power. It was also sensible to have held the ceremony of transfer of power away from the public gaze. But this was a regime change by stealth. Nothing reflected that more than Ambassador Paul Bremer8217;s hasty exit from the country. No celebrations, no banquets and no public farewells for the man who had ruled Iraq for 14 months! The regime change has not only taken the shine away from the restoration of sovereignty to the Iraqis 8212; limited as that process has been 8212; but has highlighted the deficiencies of that sovereignty and symbolically lowered the already fragile legitimacy of an interim government picked by the occupying forces.

But the challenges for Prime Minister Iyad Allawi8217;s government are clearly even greater than that for the CPA. This government does not have a popular mandate based on an electoral exercise, or the participation of community leaders, or even a constitution to base itself on. Iraq and the rest of the world would mainly judge the new Iraqi government on its ability to provide security and stability that the CPA could not. The Allawi government simply does not have the means to ensure adequate security in a country already wracked by fractious insurgencies which lately have been targeting US-appointed Iraqi police and security forces heavily. The new government8217;s dependence on US-led coalition troops for internal security would be high and likely to be a source of weakness rather than strength.

With the high risk of Iraqi resistance and insurgency increasing in the coming months, the choices for the Allawi government would be hard indeed. Allawi has vowed to crush the militancy, warning of martial law and delaying the elections slated for next January. This approach could be counter-productive in view of the lack of legitimacy that the interim government enjoys in the eyes of Iraqis and the fierce nationalism that is evident. At the same time, this is the time for Iraqi leadership and statesmanship to come into its own if it seeks genuine sovereignty at an early date and start to manage the country8217;s affairs. The sympathies of the world are with the Iraqis. If they could sink their internal differences and come together to establish peace and the process of national government formation at an early date, the international community and Iraq8217;s traditional friends would find it much easier to come to their assistance.