At the pyramid146;s summit

Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee8217;s statement that the government is not thinking of creating a CDS chief of defence staff any time s...

Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee8217;s statement that the government is not thinking of creating a CDS chief of defence staff any time soon should put at rest the normal rise in expectations and interpretations revolving round individuals which seems to gather momentum closer to the retirement of service chiefs. Seen dispassionately, this is one issue that has been far more at the root of a great deal of misunderstanding among the three services than any other single factor. It is apparent that the basis on which the Group of Ministers took their decision in February 2001 to create a CDS is doctrinally flawed. So it is good that the new government is giving itself time to address the issue because it is necessary that any change should be based on sound principles so that the institution of CDS is created for the right reasons, at the right time and in the right way.

To begin with, the central point is whether we should manage our higher military organisation on the principle of corporate/collegiate decision making or on the basis of a unitary hierarchical system. Those arguing for a 8216;single point of advice8217; and decision making would naturally opt for the latter model. But every large, modern organisation has to be managed on the collegiate principle. The defence establishment is no different. At the same time, the degree of specialisation, even within each of the services, has been increasing due to technological advances and complexities of modern warfighting. The example of how a number of specialists undertake open-heart surgery, which is as much a matter of life and death for the individual as defence is for the nation, working together as a professional collegiate team with mutual trust and coordination, is instructive in this respect.

There are many democratic countries like the US, UK, France, and others, that have set up the CDS. What characterises their higher defence organisation as different from ours is that their military power mostly operates outside the country and their higher military organisation is an integral part of their government 8212; the ministry of defence in the UK, the Pentagon in USA and so on 8212; staffed jointly by military and civilian professionals. This has not eliminated professional disagreements or turf tensions, but they are counter-balanced by decades of experience and mutual professional respect that comes from working together. If we keep on insisting, without empirical basis, that the three services need a single senapati at the top without which we are not able to work together and perform to our best, then we are in reality adding to the very problem of mistrust that we seek to solve by creating a CDS.

The real issue is that the higher defence organisation has two distinct functions to perform: one, that of creating defence capabilities for the future; and, two, of executing a war and/or employment of military power for political purposes short of war, possibly at short notice, as we saw in December 2001 after the terrorist attack on the Lok Sabha. The former involves perspective planning, procurement of weapons and equipment which could possibly come in only at a future date, recruitment, training and employment policies for military manpower, and so on. The latter involves operations with existing resources of men and material: the proverbial 8220;force in being8221;. In India we have not been able to separate the two distinctly different roles and functions. And this is most visible in the office of the head of each service, who is the commander-in-chief of the service and also concurrently the chief of staff to the defence minister for that service. Unfortunately the abolishing of the title of commander-in-chief of army, navy, air force in 1955 clouded the duality further.

So the first issue that must be addressed first is: would the CDS be a commander of the three services, or simply be what the name implies 8212; chief of staff for all three services? A careful reading of the Group of Ministers8217; Report would indicate that the former would indeed be the goal, even if it is to be achieved in stages. We would probably land up with sub-optimal hotchpotch structures in the interim. But we should be clear about the destination point before we embark on the road to CDS. This would require an amendment of the legal and constitutional authority of the present chiefs who exercise that authority as commander-in-chief of the service they command. The orders that the chief gives to his lower formations is in that capacity, while the instructions to the staff at the headquarters are essentially in his capacity as the chief of staff.

So if we want a CDS as the head of staff, then the obvious approach should be to separate the operational functions of service headquarters from their planning and management functions for creating future capabilities which, in any case, require governmental scrutiny and authority. For example, the Five Year Defence Plan lies in the domain of the chiefs of staff, while operational plans are the responsibility of the three commanders-in-chief, for which they have a joint planning committee authorised since 1947. This is not to say that we should not have a CDS; but to point out that clarification of the dual-role would help us to arrive at the goal in better shape with a better organisation than simply creating a CDS, who would also possibly carry into the job a similar duality that exists with the current organisation.

The obvious preliminary steps would be to shift all functions related to future force planning into the ministry of defence in a phased progressive manner, manned jointly by civil and military personnel to develop joint perspective plans. After adequate experience has been acquired, we could move to create a CDS but with no command functions, who would work in coordination with the defence secretary to build tomorrow8217;s defence forces. Today8217;s service headquarters would then be focused on operational and operations-related tasks and functions, headed by the commander-in-chief of the service concerned. A joint staff under the chiefs would then be able to focus on operational strategies, tactics and joint operational plans.