Ally146;s ally?

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice8217;s objectives in New Delhi were to express solidarity with the Indian people after the Mumbai aggression and buy time to prevent an escalation of the gathering tension with Pakistan into a military conflict.

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice8217;s objectives in New Delhi were to express solidarity with the Indian people after the Mumbai aggression and buy time to prevent an escalation of the gathering tension with Pakistan into a military conflict. India is obviously thankful for the first and rightly circumspect on the second. Rice is urging New Delhi to maintain its current restraint to avoid unintended consequences from a potential retaliation. Rice wants

India to allow some space for international diplomacy before it exercises its uncontested right to retaliate against the Mumbai provocation that has followed a number of recent attacks from Pakistan-based terror groups with increasing frequency and growing audacity. As Rice headed to Islamabad from New Delhi, America8217;s top soldier, Admiral Mike Mullen was travelling in the other direction. This US diplomatic two-step is likely to be followed by a host of other high-profile visitors from the international community.

As she headed to Islamabad, Rice pressed Pakistan for a 8220;robust response8221; to bring the perpetrators of the Mumbai attack to justice and prevent the recurrence of such aggression. As the days ahead unfold, however, she may not find it easy to persuade Pakistan to match its nice words after Mumbai with credible deeds. In New Delhi, Rice certainly rejected Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari8217;s search for an escape route by blaming 8220;non-state actors8221;. Rice reminded Zardari that the Pakistani state has the responsibility to act against terrorists operating from its soil. The issue is not legal but political. Both Washington and New Delhi know that Zardari has neither the power nor the authority to act against groups like Lashkar-e-Toiba, that have served as a long lance against India for the Pakistan army and the ISI.

If Washington has found it so difficult to get the Pakistan army to crack down on the Taliban and

Al-Qaeda on its western borders, there is little reason for India to believe that Rice and Mullen can get the ISI to change its colours on India. Nevertheless, it is in India8217;s own interest to give some time and space for US diplomatic efforts in Pakistan. When India decides to use military force against Pakistan, that action must be seen across the world as legitimate and a consequence of Islamabad8217;s failure to cooperate. New Delhi, however, can8217;t wait for too long. The UPA government, we hope, has not left the United States in any doubt that it expects quick and decisive results from Pakistan.