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This is an archive article published on September 16, 1998

A tinderbox next door

The NAM summit, Mandela's references to Kashmir there, and will we or won't we sign the CTBT -- these have been the focus of recent forei...

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The NAM summit, Mandela8217;s references to Kashmir there, and will we or won8217;t we sign the CTBT 8212; these have been the focus of recent foreign-policy debate. We have not taken note of important regional developments: economic problems and political fractiousness in South East Asia; Nawaz Sharif trying to counter disaffection by populist Islamisation. Most important, Taliban seems poised for full control of Afghanistan for now.

The situation could be the harbinger of extended violence and regional instability. Granted that India8217;s capacity to intervene is subject to geographic, political and military limitations. But this does not mean that we must remain inactive.

After capturing Mazar-e-Sharif, Taliban has captured Shiberghan and most of the northern provinces under the Rabbani government8217;s control. They have surrounded Ahmed Shah Masood8217;s forces in the Panjsher valley, extended control in Bamian and strategically dominate the Afghan-Tadjik and Afghan-Uzbek borders.

The Rabbani government8217;s forces are inretreat, though Ahmed Shah Masood8217;s continue effective resistance. This consolidation has provoked Iran to deploy nearly 70,000 troops on the border and undertake military exercises. The Taliban has responded by concentrating its forces on the border and warning that military intervention would bring a bloodbath reminiscent of the Iran-Iraq conflict of the 8217;80s.

A significant element in Taliban8217;s victories has been the changing of loyalties by many local commanders in northern and western Afghanistan who yielded without resistance. Some were loyal until recently to General Rashid Dostum, the leading military figure in the northern alliance. The fall of his stronghold Shiberghan is attributed to this. Taliban has strong cash flows from Saudi Arabia and weapons and logistical assistance from the ISI and Pakistan8217;s defence establishment.

American MNCs engaged in oil and natural gas exploration in Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have reportedly promised even returns to Taliban if, after stabilising its authority,it allows pipelines to be built through Afghan territory to Pakistan.

In contrast, Iranians, though opposed to the Taliban, have been reticent about giving extensive military assistance to the northern alliance. Tadjikistan is in turmoil. Factions in its civil war have links to Taliban. Uzbekistan, while politically and militarily capable of structuring resistance to Taliban, has reservations about becoming enmeshed in the conflict and about Dostum and Ahmed Shah Masood. The Russian Federation is so embroiled in internal turmoil that it does not have the will to resist Taliban8217;s incremental control. As Taliban captured Mazar-e-Sharif, the Tadjik government appealed to Boris Yeltsin to increase security assistance to Tadjikistan and strengthen Russian para-military border guards there.

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Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Nester-ushkin8217;s issued a statement on August 12: 8220;The military advance of Taliban8230;is taking place with the direct assistance of Pakistani armed forces. Both have strategic planning andequipment supplies. There is concrete evidence to support this including the capture of Pakistani armed forces personnel. Russia and other members of the CIS must take all necessary measures to guarantee the safety of their border. Peace must be restored in Afghanistan among the Afghan parties to the conflict without interference from other countries, but through the international community under the aegis of the UN.8221;

Iran called for an immediate ceasefire in northern Afghanistan and resumption of negotiations. Its Supreme leader Ali Khamenei publicly stated that Iran had no desire to intervene in response to Taliban8217;s warnings against direct Iranian involvement. Neither Russia nor Iran is inclined to provide open, direct operational military support to the Rabbani government.

The Central Asian republics most affected, Tadjikistan and Uzbekistan, want to ensure that Taliban is not provoked into extending its operations into their territories. Despite parallel concerns, none of these countries has astructured response. The anxiety seems just to ensure that the conflict is confined to Afghan territory and dialogue resumed. The bilateral and political mechanisms for a negotiated settlement of the Afghan civil war stand marginalised. Consultations between Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey have tapered off in proportion to Taliban8217;s increasing clout. The UN Secretary-General8217;s representative has been reduced to inactivity by the military reality. There have been no multilateral discussions under UN aegis for eight months or so apart from routine meetings.

What is the likelihood of Taliban establishing an effective government? What would be its regional ramifications? Even if Taliban8217;s military victories are a prelude to its central authority, Afghanistan8217;s civil war is marked by such dramatic fluctuations that it predicating anything on a Taliban government coming to power is premature. Taliban itself is afflicted by factional strife between its regional commanders. How far will they cooperate whentotal power is within reach? Though Taliban is militarily comparatively better organised, its religious extremism and ideological rigidity prevent it from being accommodating enough to sustain a possible coalition of forces for a stable government. One must wait to discern prospects of any definitive scenario emerging.

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Nevertheless, a Taliban-dominated Afg-hanistan would generate political and ethnic instability and religious extremism, in Afghanistan and in its neighbourhood. Conflict and tension between the Pushtoons on the one hand and the Tadjiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras on the other will characterise Afghanistan for years to come. Shia-Sunni antagonisms will afflict not only Afghanistan.

Pakistan itself will be subjected to centrifugal forces by a Pushtoon-dominated Taliban government in Kabul, in the Northwest Frontier Province and Baluchistan. Taliban, backed by extremist Islamic forces, can cause subversion and instability not only in Central Asia and Iran but also in Jammu and Kashmir. ATaliban-controlled Afghanis-tan would be a long-term obstruction to India8217;s relations with the Central Asian republics. Though India may ultimately have to deal with whichever government controls Afghanistan, and though it cannot directly intervene at present, it should initiate consultations with the Central Asian Republics and Iran, the Russian Federation and the US to focus the Security Council on developments there.

Taliban8217;s support to Osama Bin Laden and trans-border terrorism should persuade the US to join in a collective effort to stabilise the situation through a UN initiative. The annual session of the UN General Assembly commences in New York in ten days. Afghanistan should an active item on the agenda of the Indian delegation.

 

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