Opinion The Great Game Folio

Three decades ago this month the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan made South Asia a theatre where the Cold War was fought to its bitter end. The subcontinent has not been the same since,thanks to the Western empowerment of violent religious extremism to defeat Soviet Communism.

While the Soviet Union disappeared from the map,the Pakistan army found great advantage in extending the same strategy towards Afghanistan and India. The bloody results are now very much part of our lives.

Obama’s speech Tuesday night is about the difficulties of putting the genie of religious extremism back into the bottle. After eight years of a listless effort,the United States has now arrived at a make-or-break moment in Afghanistan.

While he is expected to announce a surge of 30,000 troops,Obama is likely to underline that the US commitment is not open-ended. Given the faltering domestic support for the war in Afghanistan,the only way Obama can gain backing for an escalation is by coupling it with a foreseeable exit. As he brings US troop levels to the psychologically important figure of 100,000,Obama will want to explain the objectives of the war and justify them to the American people.

At the end of March when he announced the conclusion of a review of Afghan policy,Obama said the objective was to “disrupt,defeat and dismantle” the al Qaida and its affiliates in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Whether he simply reaffirms this or reframes it,the indications are that Pakistan will figure a lot more prominently in his speech,which in turn brings India into the equation.

Delhi’s concerns

For Delhi,the good news from Washington is that the Obama administration has recognised the importance of ending the segmented American approach to terrorism in our neighbourhood.

Obama is now reportedly pressing Islamabad to act against all extremist groups including the Afghan Taliban and the Lashkar-e-Taiba — the two organisations nurtured by the Pak Army to gain advantage vis-a-vis Kabul and Delhi.

In return for a comprehensive war against extremism,Washington is promising a solid new partnership with Islamabad and offering to address its security concerns vis-a-vis India.

If Delhi can keep its emotions in check for a moment,it will find there is no reason to object. If Washington can get the Pak Army to disown the LeT and put an end to cross border terrorism,India has every incentive to take the peace process with Pakistan forward.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his predecessor Atal Bihari Vajpayee have both said they are ready to resolve the Kashmir question if Pakistan ends its support for terrorism and agrees to a comprehensive normalisation of bilateral relations.

The problem for Delhi does not lie with the kind of formulations on South Asian peace and cooperation that Obama is likely to make tonight. They are in fact a big advance from Bush’s unwillingness to see the dual nature of Pakistan’s policies towards terrorism.

The real challenge for Delhi is about holding Washington’s feet to fire on what Obama might say about separating the Pak Army from its chosen instruments of terror.

It is reasonable to assume that the Pak Army will do its best to wriggle out of the current pressures from Washington. India’s objective,then,must be to make sure that the Obama administration will persist with the goals that it might set for itself in Afghanistan and Pakistan now.

Special envoy

To complement the intensified military effort,Obama is working with Prime Minister Gordon Brown to convene an international conference on Afghanistan in London next month.

The objective is to create a framework to prevent competitive intervention in Afghanistan by its neighbours and encourage them to move towards regional economic integration.

As the military and diplomatic consequences of Obama’s new policy unfold,India will need a full time Special Envoy who can bring a measure of coherence to Delhi’s Afghan strategy as well as coordinate the multiple strands of diplomatic engagement with our neighbours as well as the great powers.

The writer is Henry A. Kissinger Chair in Foreign Policy and International Relations at the Library of Congress,Washington DC