Opinion Now the G-3

All those analysts who saw the G-2 — the vaunted global condominium of America and China — as somewhat premature are likely to be a little more deferential to the G-3. The preliminary indications are that the G-3 forum is aimed at alleviating the fears in Tokyo that it might be marginalised amidst growing engagement between Washington and Beijing.

The G-3 will also be seen as trumping the idea of the Asian democratic quad — the US,India,Japan and Australia — working together to shape the Asian security architecture. After just one meeting of senior officials,the quad seemed to fade away.

All those Indian foreign policy traditionalists who were objecting to the democratic quad as an American design to contain China will now find that it is New Delhi that will have to cool its heels when Washington and Tokyo cozy up to Beijing.

The July meeting of the G-3 and the resurrection of the forgotten G-2 — US and Russia — next week in Moscow should bury any residual romanticism in New Delhi about balancing Washington through the BRICs and SCO.

There are two lessons from all these developments for India. One is that China will be central to any new regional or global arrangement. The other is that Beijing’s new political clout comes from its growing economic strength and military power and not from ideological posturing.

Naval CBMs

After a series of tense incidents between their navies in the South China Sea,Beijing and Washington have underlined the importance of negotiating bilateral maritime confidence-building measures.

At the tenth round of China-US defence consultations last week in Beijing,the two sides decided to hold talks in July to discuss preventing incidents at sea,including ones in which Chinese vessels have jostled US navy ships in waters off China’s coast.

The two sides,however,remain far apart on the source of their maritime tension in the South China Sea. While the US emphasises its rights under the principle of the freedom of navigation,China insists that those rights do not include the option of surveillance.

The Indian foreign office and the navy have every reason to follow this debate between Washington and Beijing on the rights and limitations on the maritime freedoms.

As the Indian navy heads out into the South China Sea and the Western Pacific Ocean and the Chinese navy begins to operate in the Indian Ocean,there is bound to be new maritime friction between the two Asian giants. It makes sense then for the two sides to begin a substantive dialogue on maritime and naval issues.

Southward ho

If you think China’s growing global presence is driven by the logic of resource security,think again. Amidst China’s rising economic and political profile in the tiny island states of the South Pacific,it is difficult to make the argument that Beijing is eyeing the resources of the region.

The fact is that China has acquired the intellectual capacity to appreciate the geopolitical importance of different regions of the world and develop specific diplomatic initiatives aimed at raising Beijing’s influence in far-flung regions.

High-level political visits,targeted economic aid and sustained military diplomacy have within a few years made Beijing the preferred partner in much of the South Pacific. Washington,Tokyo and Canberra suddenly find themselves outmanned and outgunned in the South Pacific.

India might have had a longer and deeper association with the South Pacific,especially in Fiji. But New Delhi’s security establishment is too stretched to develop a long-term geopolitical strategy to seemingly remote regions.

The writer is a Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies,Nanyang Technological University,Singapore