An important anniversary in India’s technological history passed largely unnoticed last week — the launch of the Satellite Instructional Television Experiment (SITE) in 1975. A pioneering collaboration between the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) and the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), SITE used the American ATS-6 satellite to beam educational programmes in local languages to over 2,400 villages across six of India’s most underdeveloped states. The content included primary education, health awareness, agricultural practices, and national integration.
SITE remains a landmark in the technological imagination of India’s developmental state. For the US, the project was an expression of “scientific internationalism”— the Cold War-era belief that modern science and technology could advance peace and prosperity through international collaboration. But that idealism quickly faltered. Following India’s 1974 nuclear test, Washington’s enthusiasm for technology cooperation gave way to non-proliferation anxieties. It would take three decades to overcome these disputes and rebuild bilateral trust. This effort culminated in the launch of the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (ICET) under President Joe Biden in 2023, aimed at reinvigorating India-US cooperation in advanced technologies.
Whether ICET can survive renewed political turbulence in the bilateral relationship — marked by differences on Russia, trade, and Pakistan — remains uncertain. Yet, a more structural challenge looms: The increasingly divergent trajectories of the Indian and American technology ecosystems.
Even in 1975, the SITE programme featured private sector participation. The ATS satellite was built by the Fairchild Corporation (now defunct). But in the years since, the American technology landscape has undergone a dramatic transformation. NASA, once the dominant actor in space, now shares the stage with private firms like Elon Musk’s SpaceX, which conducts more launches annually than the government agency itself.
Over the past two decades, America’s dynamic technology sector has not only accelerated innovation but also given the US a strategic edge over its rivals. The US government continues to play a vital role — particularly in defence procurement and standard-setting — but increasingly acts as a catalyst rather than a controller.
China, by contrast, has charted a different course. Since Deng Xiaoping’s call for “scientific modernisation” in the late 1970s, the Chinese state has pursued a centralised, mission-driven model of technological advancement. Decades of double-digit growth, rapid industrialisation, and heavy investment in scientific research and higher education have propelled China into the front ranks of global technological power, especially in AI and space technology. Despite starting later than India, China’s civilian space programme now competes with that of the US and is expanding its global footprint through initiatives like the Digital and Space Silk Roads.
India’s own trajectory remains moored somewhere in between the American and Chinese models. Recent reforms have introduced greater dynamism into India’s space sector, but Delhi is still some distance from fully mobilising its private sector to secure a larger share of the global space economy or rejuvenating its higher education and scientific research establishments.
While India finds its footing, the global tech landscape is being reshaped by dramatic developments in the US. In recent weeks, the Trump administration has unveiled two major initiatives — on AI and cryptocurrency — that symbolise a novel approach to techno-politics. Unlike Biden, who sought to regulate and constrain Big Tech, Donald Trump has given it a free hand. In embracing Silicon Valley’s libertarian elite, Trump is remaking the American state not as a regulator of big technology, but as its enthusiastic enabler.
What emerges is a distinct philosophy of techno-capitalism: Unapologetically post-liberal, aggressively nationalist, fiercely deregulatory, and ambitiously expansionist. Trump’s 2025 AI policy prioritises dismantling regulatory barriers, building data infrastructure, promoting AI-led manufacturing, and mobilising hundreds of billions of dollars in public and private investment. While all major economies aspire to grow AI, the combination of American capital and Silicon Valley’s technological prowess sets the US apart.
Trump’s techno-capitalism also extends into financial innovation. The recently enacted “GENIUS Act” marks a decisive break from the Biden administration’s cautious approach to cryptocurrencies. The Act creates a framework for dollar-backed stablecoins, requiring them to be fully backed 1:1 by liquid US assets such as cash or short-term treasuries. It also mandates reserve disclosures and consumer protections, laying the groundwork for mainstream adoption of stablecoins as digital payment systems.
The policy aims to reinforce the US dollar’s role as the world’s reserve currency and counter growing calls for “de-dollarisation,” including from BRICS nations. Rejecting the idea of a central bank digital currency, the Trump administration is also setting up a Strategic Bitcoin Reserve and has ended prosecutions of major crypto firms initiated during the Biden years. Here too, the motivation is not just economic—it is geopolitical.
At the ideological heart of this techno-capitalist revolution is Peter Thiel, a venture capitalist and co-founder of PayPal and Palantir, and a staunch supporter of Trump’s tech agenda. Thiel insists that true innovation arises not from state mandates or regulatory frameworks, but from visionary entrepreneurs liberated from liberal-democratic constraints. His worldview blends libertarian individualism with a muscular nationalism that sees China as America’s principal technological adversary.
This marks a decisive break from the techno-optimism of the 1990s, when the rise of the internet was seen as heralding a borderless, decentralised world where the state would gradually recede. That dream proved short-lived. Governments reasserted themselves through regulation, surveillance, and digital sovereignty. Today, we are witnessing the rise of a new state-capital compact—a “tech broligarchy” in which Silicon Valley elites and Washington collaborate to pursue technological supremacy not for utopian ends, but for strategic advantage.
This alliance is central to Trump’s broader effort to reconfigure global trade, finance, and security. Whether one supports or opposes this project, its ambition and momentum are undeniable. If even a fraction of the current AI hype is realised and a portion of the planned investment materialises, American techno-capitalism will loom large over the world’s economic future.
India cannot remain untouched by these shifts. The celebrated Indian IT sector— long a symbol of the country’s global economic integration and a major contributor to its GDP—now faces serious vulnerabilities. As AI begins to automate many of the services that defined India’s IT outsourcing boom, traditional jobs may disappear or become obsolete. Add to this Trump’s growing hostility toward H-1B visas, and the threat to India’s digital workforce becomes even more acute. India’s ambition to be a major exporter of tech talent could also be undermined by the West’s rising techno-nationalism and hostility to immigration.
We are only at the beginning of this techno-capitalist revolution. Will its march be inevitable and triumphant? The alliance between American populism and Silicon Valley could unravel over time due to internal contradictions or commercial rivalries. But the structural shifts now underway in American techno-capitalism—and their global implications—are likely to be enduring.
For India, the imperatives are clear. There is an urgent need to overhaul the domestic tech sector, expand investment in scientific research, and better integrate private enterprise into national innovation strategies. The country must also prepare its industry, workforce, and regulatory institutions for a new era of technological transformation.
The writer is contributing editor on international affairs for The Indian Express and senior fellow at the Council for Strategic and Defence Research
