Opinion A nuclear interaction
Homi Sethna,the moving force behind Indias nuclear programme
When I think of Homi Sethna,my mind goes back 31 years to the day in early April 1979 when I flew down to Mumbai to hand over to him a sealed cover containing the handwritten minutes of the meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs (CCPA) signed by the cabinet secretary,Nirmal Mukarji. It was in my handwriting and had one sentence: The Cabinet,having considered the issue,gave appropriate directions to the Chairman,Atomic Energy Commission.
Two days earlier the CCPA under the chairmanship of Prime Minister Morarji Desai considered the report of the Joint Intelligence Committee,of which I was the chairman,setting out its assessment that Pakistan was on its way to produce a nuclear weapon with enriched uranium obtained through the centrifuge process. Though I was the additional secretary in the Cabinet Secretariat and the official minutes writer,I was not present in that highly hush-hush meeting. Apart from the five cabinet ministers,the prime minister,Foreign Minister Vajpayee,Defence Minister Jagjivan Ram,Home Minister H.M. Patel and the Finance Minister Charan Singh,only three officials were present. Mukarji,V. Shankar,secretary to the PM,and Sethna,chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). After the meeting,Mukarji dictated the minutes to me to be put on file to get approved by the PM. Though Morarji Desai,according to Mukarji,was against initiating any action and he was supported by Vajpayee,the other three ministers wanted the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) to commence research for a weapon. After Morarji Desai approved the minutes,Mukarji instructed me to deliver the handwritten minutes personally to Sethna in Mumbai.
My second major interaction with Sethna was when he proposed the appointment of Dr Fareeduddin as director of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC). Because of the personal differences that developed between Sethna and Raja Ramanna after the Pokharan test,the latter (who was director,BARC) came away from the DAE and was appointed scientific advisor to the defence minister. Sethna wanted to fill up the vacancy. When the matter was considered by the cabinets appointments committee,V. Shankar,the secretary to the PM,expressed his reservations and suggested that the department be reorganised. Prime Minister Morarji Desai then directed that the matter be examined by a committee chaired by Dr Atma Ram,then director-general of the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) and a close personal friend of the PM,the cabinet secretary and the AEC chairman. Since they were busy,the matter was remitted to be considered and reported by a representative each of the cabinet secretary and the AEC chairman. The cabinet secretary nominated me and Dr Sethna suggested Subramanyam Siva,who had long been secretary to Dr Bhabha and himself. When the report was to be finalised,I sought a separate interview with Sethna. Since the two of us were privy to the information that the department had been directed to commence research on the weapon,I asked Sethna whether it would not be more appropriate that he held the post of BARC director,to lead the programme himself instead of pushing Fareeduddin for the post,especially since he was not a physicist. He accepted my point. The post of BARC director lay vacant when Indira Gandhi,on her return to office in 1980,transferred Ramanna back to the DAE.
My third major interaction with Sethna resulted in Morarji Desai having to reverse one of his stands. On one of my visits to his office,I asked Sethna whether he was happy with the PMs decision to discuss with the Americans their proposal on examining the feasibility of the full scope safeguards to the Indian nuclear programme. Sethna said he was totally opposed to the idea and it was not an American proposal but one initiated by the PMs secretary,V. Shankar. I pointed out that the PM had told Parliament that it was an American proposal and there was no harm in India discussing it with the US. Sethna pulled out of his file the fax message from the Americans,which referred to the full scope safeguards discussion as Shankars proposal and proceeded to outline the US point of view. When I asked,Sethna readily gave me a photocopy of the document,which I then showed the cabinet secretary,Nirmal Mukarji. He took it to Morarji Desai and told him that he was in danger of being accused of misleading Parliament by presenting it as an American initiative. That put an end to further discussions on full scope safeguards with the Americans.
The writer is a senior defence analyst express@expressindia.com
Share
