
Amid all the official inquiries, political recriminations and postwar claims and counter-claims, one basic fact about Iraq now appears incontrovertible. The fact is, at the time the war was launched, Iraq did not possess the non-conventional weapons capability that the US and Britain alleged. It did not, therefore, pose the 8220;serious and current threat8221; to the UK national interest, to the Middle East region and to the US that was officially claimed8230;
The moment of last resort, meaning urgent, unavoidable use of military force, had not remotely been reached. It may be said that the initial findings of the Iraq Survey Group are incomplete. But does anybody seriously believe that if the CIA8217;s team had found any persuasive WMD evidence at all, that evidence would not have been broadcast to the heavens long ago? It is true that WMD could yet be found; but such a turn-up after almost six months of looking is unlikely and would rightly be viewed with suspicion. The last thing we need is another sexed-up report8230;
It is often said that, but for the war, Saddam would still be in power. But if his overthrow was the aim, why was this not baldly stated? Because, in Britain, it would be deemed illegal. That is why it is now doubly important that the attorney-general8217;s legal advice be published. This WMD fiasco has brought into question the judgment, competence and candour of the intelligence services and, indeed, of Mr Blair and senior ministers. As a matter of fact, not opinion, Britain went to war on a false premise. It hardly needs to be said how very serious and very damaging a conclusion that is.
Excerpted from an editorial in 8216;The Guardian8217; on September 26