With an enemy like this

Just three weeks into the new year, Advani8217;s prediction seems almost prophetic. No one thought that the old ghost of Bofors would come alive again, thanks to the ham-handed handling of Ottavio Quatrrocchi8217;s forgotten banks accounts, the BJP has found fresh ammunition to bombard the government with.

And now a much grander gift 8212; the chance to form a government in Karnataka, and shed the tag of being a party confined to north and west India. Of course, Karnataka has long been considered the BJP8217;s 8216;sunrise8217; state, where 8212; as in Gujarat 8212; the party has expanded on the strength of the groundwork done by the Vishwa Hindu Parishad and its offshoots. But though the BJP emerged as the single largest party in the 2004 elections, it was forced to sit in the Opposition. In Karnataka politics, despite 8212; or perhaps because of the saffron growth 8212; 8220;secularism8221; was not just a shibboleth. The USP of H.D. Deve Gowda8217;s Janata DalS was his commitment to secularism 8212; and even his bitternesss towards the state Congress could not make him join hands with the BJP.

That is why the split in the JDS, executed by Deve Gowda8217;s ambitious son, and his decision to ally with the BJP, is the best piece of news the new BJP chief could hope for. Congress spin doctors might claim that a JDS-BJP alliance will ultimately help the Congress secure the entire secular space in Karnataka. But the reverse 8212; as past history has shown 8212; could well happen. The BJP is adept at piggy-back riding on Janata formations and then discarding the pig usually of the Janata variety to gain complete control. Gujarat may be the 8220;laboratory of Hindutva8221; today, but the BJP first tasted power in the state as a junior partner of the Janata Dal. Ditto, in Rajasthan.

Sure, the Kumaraswamy-BJP alliance may not last long. But even a short stint in power could work to the BJP8217;s long-term advantage. Vajpayee was prime minister for just 13 days in 1996, but that certainly helped him acquire a prime-ministerial persona when elections came around in 1998. Just as Nitish Kumar cut a sorry figure when he failed to win a vote of confidence in 2000, only to make it comfortably to the CM8217;s chair five years down the line.

Under the circumstances, it is easy to understand Rajnath Singh8217;s buoyant confidence today. His acolytes are already crowing about their neta8217;s 8220;political skills8221;, at his ability to turn the crown of thorns into a wreath of feathers 8212; the Karnataka coup its most colourful plume.

But three weeks is too short a time to guage the depth of a 8216;good patch8217; and terribly premature before the January 27 vote of confidence. More important, to attribute the Karnataka 8220;success8221; to the BJP8217;s regime change is not just incorrect, it is grossly unfair to its true architect: the Congress party.

The BJP8217;s zig-zag road to success has always been paved with Congress8217;s misadventures. The BJP, more than all the Third Front constituents put together, gained the most from the Congress decline in the 8217;80s and 8217;90s. In that period, the BJP8217;s politics of Hindutva was helped at every stage by the Congress leadership8217;s own flirtation with the 8216;soft8217; version of that phenomenon. From Mrs Gandhi8217;s 8216;Hindu card8217; in the Jammu and Delhi elections in 1983, and her accommodation of the VHP8217;s Ekatmata Yagna Yatra, to the opening of the disputed Ayodhya temple and subsequent shilanyas under the Rajiv Gandhi regime and the facilitation of the demolition of the Babri Masjid by Narasimha Rao, the Congress unwittingly created a growing constituency for the fledgling BJP.

That has changed under Sonia Gandhi. Her background, perhaps, makes her the most 8216;Nehruvian8217; of the Gandhis, at least as far as commitment to secularism and anathema for Hindutva is concerned.

Nevertheless, the Congress is still helping the BJP. Not, like before, in the arena of ideology but in the realm of realpolitik. And the principal reason is that the Congress 8212; in contrast to the BJP 8212; remains far less adept and ever so unwilling to learn the difficult art of coalition management.

One reason, certainly, is rooted in their respective histories. Compared to the Grand Old Party, the BJP is just a toddler in national politics and knows it needs the helping hand of regional parties to walk into all-India adulthood. The Congress, steeped in nostalgia of its robust past, regards them as despised walking sticks, daily reminders of its decline and decrepitude. But nostalgia is never the way forward in life or politics. The Congress realised as much, effecting the transition from the 8216;go it alone8217; Panchmarhi Resolution of 1998, to the 2003 Shimla Declaration in favour of coalition politics. And on the eve of the 2004 elections, Sonia Gandhi8217;s hectic one-on-one meetings with every regional satrap and potential ally worked wonders 8212; and resulted in the UPA coalition government.

But coalition management is not just about common minimum programmes and commitments to the abstract ideals of a 8216;secular, pluralist, inclusive Republic8217;. It is also about massaging fragile egos, playing fair, treating small partners with a a degree of respect, not backstabbing an ally for paltry electoral gains.

But Congress leaders, even after theoretically accepting the need to adjust to a coalition era, have failed to internalise that ethos in their day-to-day dealings. The fiasco in Karnataka, no matter what the outcome, has only exposed the Congress8217; inability to keep a partner difficult, no doubt happy.

Ideological conviction might be enough for the Left to back the Congress only to keep out the BJP. The long term target of the BJP, after all, is the Left. But 8216;8216;secularism8217;8217; alone is clearly not enough for smaller parties to hang on to the Congress 8212; not if they continue to be treated as usurpers and gatecrashers at the high table. If the Congress does not draw the right lessons from the Karnataka coup, don8217;t be surprised if the Samajwadi Party, the TRS, DMK, and even the NCP sooner or later become allies 8212; natural or not 8212; of the BJP.