Whose moment is this?

Twelve years later, 1989 again dramatically, but in a slightly more evolved way as there was no insistence on forming 8220;one8221; party, saw a former Congress defence minister and chief minister of Uttar Pradesh take on his parent party, trounce it, and with about 150 seats, get the support of both a resurgent Hindu nationalist BJP and a Left, keen on playing a larger role on the national stage. However, after his dramatic resignation in 1990, one saw the Congress, also agreeable to providing 8220;outside support8221;, enter the fray as a player. The Congress entered the picture as a big party content to allow other formations to rule, by supporting them from the outside. This was a big shift for the centrist party, which then scoffed at coalitions 8212; a change not often recorded or acknowledged adequately. Analysts typically date Congress8217;s coalitional era only from the time of the Panchmarhi meeting when they formally spoke of the new reality of India.

In 1991, though, Chandra Shekhar8217;s government was brought down on the grounds that there was surveillance outside the house of the Congress party president, Rajiv Gandhi. However, an election in the same year, and Rajiv Gandhi8217;s assassination in the midst of it, saw P.V. Narasimha Rao take charge as prime minister. This was clearly the phase when leaders representing the backward castes in the two states sending the maximum numbers to the Lok Sabha were elbowing out the Congress from there 8212; its disappearance was near-sudden 8212; and the phase, called 8220;fragmented8221; at that time, was actually the consolidation of a different kind of politics. The announcement that the Mandal Report was being implemented had been opposed by all three major formations the Congress, the BJP, even the Left, but it was precisely this which they opposed that shaped them, their policies and the politics of the time. The idea of the Third Front, a new way, appeared to take shape.

In 1992, the destruction of the Babri Masjid, with a Congress government in power in Delhi and the BJP in power in Lucknow, also seemed to put the brakes on the BJP8217;s mobilisation on the basis of Hindu nationalism, as well as breaking the 8220;trust8221; of the Muslim vote share in the Congress in UP at least. Mulayam Singh Yadav emerged as its new claimant, not wholly, but at least in substantial terms.

In 1998, came the other big shift in politics, with the BJP emerging as a successful coalition manager, and the formation of the National Democratic Alliance. It was a watershed as there was general acceptability of the BJP as an efficient coalition leader, well-versed in the art of political management and give and take. The fact that it was not in power or did not carry the baggage of the 8220;old and big ruling party8221; 8212; which the Congress did 8212; helped it here, and it was easy for it to accede to requests and yield territory. The early 8217;90s phase of shunning the BJP seemed over, at least for smaller regional parties. But this phase saw the emergence of a degree of cooperation between the Congress and the Left on the national political scene: when the NDA continued with business as usual after the Gujarat riots in 2002, 8220;secularism8221; as a political war cry again became a rallying point.

Eventually, in 2004, the United Progressive Alliance came into being, and it appeared there were now two coalitions that were possible, a Centre-Right one and a Centre-Left one. This too was a turning point in India8217;s political scene.

The Indo-US nuclear deal 8212; being a very important component of India8217;s position in the new world, in deciding what kind of India would rise to engage with the rest of the world and its neighbourhood 8212; is a subject that should have invoked the kind of debate and passion that it did, on both sides. But with the 8220;deal8221; ending up as the breaking point in ties between two big and serious formations, there are implications which go beyond what can be fathomed immediately, possibly by either observers or the players themselves. If the possibility of the Left ending up voting with the BJP to pull down a government is something surprising to many, then so is the fact of the BJP taking such a contrarian position against its own past policies when in power which favoured a close and strategic tie-up with the United States. The Congress has rustled up a Deal rath and a slogan quickly 8212; Atomic Deal hone do, deshwaasiyon ko chain ki neend sone do 8212; referring to the power cuts that are supposed to be over with nuclear power coming in. But what other parties will say after the 8220;trust vote8221; or the next elections is anything but clear. What is clear is that July 2008 has been a watershed.

seema.chishtiexpressindia.com