When communists say let146;s talk

It may be recalled that the Korean war led to the commencement of the famous Panmunjeom talks on July 10, 1951. While United Nations forces met with North Korean and Chinese officials at Panmunjeom for truce talks, Soviet supremo Joseph Stalin was opposed to them and used various stratagems to delay them. Chairman Mao had his own agenda and the net result was that the 8216;talks8217; have been going on ever since, long after Stalin and Mao had dep arted, and Panmunjeom has entered the English lexicon as being synonymous with endless, inconclusive jaw-jawing.

But the Chinese used talks in a variety of ways to advance their interests and had little hesitation in supping with the devil if it was so warranted. History records that when there were no formal links between the US and China in the early fifties and tension mounted over the Taiwan issue, Chinese leaders entered into the Warsaw talks in 1958 8212; where the ambassadors of the two countries to Poland met intermittently. And, as is well-known, these talks continued for a full 13 years until the famous Nixon-Kissinger breakthrough with Beijing in 1971. Closer home, the Sino-Indian border talks under the aegis of the JWG is still a work in progress, and consensual resolution a distant prospect.

There is a need, therefore, to define both a time-line and an agenda for the current intra-UPA talks so that they do not become protracted or inconclusive. If the Left parties are seeking clarification, surely this can be provided in a few days8217; time by the government and may not require putting the nuclear deal on hold. Alternatively, if it is the objective of the Left to extend the talks well beyond September, then they have already realised this goal with the amber light being flashed by the Congress leadership.

The debate in India, after the text of the 123 agreement was made public on August 3, is mired in political contradictions. Most national polls 8212; the India-Bharat divide notwithstanding 8212; are hugely in favour of obtaining the benefits of the deal. The US is perceived as a repository of opportunity in this era of globalisation. This explains why most young Indians are more likely to head towards the US than, say, Russia or China today.

By raising ontological issues and going back to first principles at this stage, the Left and the BJP whose latest position has been again clarified by L.K. Advani run the risk of jeopardising the deal and hence national interest. This begs the deeper question, that the core issue: what is Indian national interest? Can it be defined only by the intransigent position taken by the Left and ironically echoed by the BJP 8212; an inflexible anti-Americanism? It is nobody8217;s case that India8217;s strategic interests are congruent with those of the US. They never can be, since the elephant and the eagle have inherently different DNAs and world views. But a broad correspondence in the 21st century? Most certainly yes. And as regards India getting sucked into the US strategic embrace over its many ill-advised military initiatives, it merits recall that the mild-mannered prime minister, Manmohan Singh, had no hesitation in telling the US Congress that the Bush policy in Iraq was a mistake.

The criticality of the nuclear deal is that it must be voted by the current US Congress before the 2008 election fever grips that body. It would be in India8217;s interest to have the 123 up-down vote before that. In the mean time, India8217;s political worthies must be encouraged to debate the issue and have their anxieties assuaged. But the right lessons must be drawn by the Left from Panmunjeom and Warsaw.

The writer is a strategic analyst