Peaceful provocation

In refusing permission to welcome the head of the Indian armys Northern Command as part of a standard,long-planned,high-level defence exchange,the Chinese authorities have to have known precisely what they were doing. The trip had been decided in January,when at the annual defence dialogue,one general-level Indian officer was supposed to be selected to visit Chinese installations. When Lieutenant General B.S. Jaswal was picked,however,the Chinese objected,saying that he was unwelcome because he controlled a disputed area Jammu and Kashmir. Yet barely a year ago the current army chief then heading Eastern Command,which includes Arunachal Pradesh,still claimed by China as South Tibet was invited to China for a similar set of meetings. The government has responded by suspending defence exchanges.

This move should be seen for what it is: ramping up Chinas assertiveness,and a clear reminder to India that it can be kept off-balance unless,that is,India adjusts its expectations nimbly. The simple truth is that the Chinese establishment has been behind enough unpredictable actions to show that the goalposts have been moved. Without having the expectation of such provocation,New Delhi is having to react each time with equanimity. Remember how an Asian Development Bank aid package was blocked because of a mention of Arunachal? Or how visa applications from residents of Jamp;K were processed on appended pieces of paper? This is a pattern of behaviour for China now,one not just visible in its relationship with India: its relations with Vietnam seemed on the up-and-up,till the Chinese suddenly ramped up their rhetoric on territorial disputes in the South China Sea,and a Chinese general said the US was using Vietnam against China.

India and China will continue to enhance trade possibilities,and there are enough stakeholders in this engagement in both countries. But after two decades of tranquil relations between the two countries,India needs to adjust to the challenge of power rising on its borders. Now the traditional assumptions of our foreign policy may no longer be valid. This has two implications. One,militarily,on the ground we need better infrastructure on the borders. Two,we need to be more clear-eyed in taking stock of the adjustments that need to be made given Chinas phenomenal rise.