Being Holbrooke

Richard Holbrooke,the Obama administrations special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan,has always been a difficult person to second-guess. As the formidable architect of the Bosnia peace accords in the 90s,he has a long history of diplomatic induction in the United States arena of overseas intervention notably Vietnam and Bosnia. The latter has been his calling card for more than a decade now. But it was the former that was to have determined Americas choices in a region remapped as Af-Pak precisely on the remit of his new assignment. He would be,it was held,mindful of the differences between Vietnam and Af-Pak,but would also be careful to heed the lessons of Vietnam. However,just over a year into his assignment,it is becoming clear that Holbrooke in Af-Pak is becoming an object lesson for future diplomats on what they should not do. Indeed,envoys of other countries in the region often joke that their challenge is not just to manage Af-Pak,but also to contain Holbrooke.

In an astonishing intervention this week,Holbrooke chose to weigh in on the February 26 terrorist attack in Kabul,in which the dead included six Indian citizens. I dont accept the fact that this was an attack on an Indian facility like the Indian embassy. They were foreigners,non-Indian foreigners hurt. It was a soft target. Lets not jump to conclusions. The remarks not just contradicted the assessment of Afghan officials that a Pakistan-based group,specifically the Lashkar-e-Toiba,had targeted Indians. They elicited suspicion about the chessboard on which Holbrooke was crafting his current moves. It is no secret that while Holbrooke makes dry jokes about avoiding the K-word,India has often discouraged him from visiting New Delhi. On Friday,he regretted his recent outburst which,given the Holbrooke legend of territorially holding the centrestage,is worth a reread in its entirety.

This is not about point-scoring. The Holbrooke controversy is a reminder of the appalling failures of Obamas special representative and also of the mis-steps of his policy-making on Afghanistan and Pakistan. The calendar imposed by the US presidents commitment to start withdrawing American forces from Afghanistan in 2011 has led diverse elements to play for the post-exit stakes. Holbrookes gaffe is a disturbing indication that Americas top officials in the region are yet to gain a clear understanding of the forces that are invested in the long-term stabilisation of Afghanistan and those that are not.