Two purush, one moment

L K Advani made the intriguing statement in the US recently when he said that we have to 8220;give and take8221; to achieve peace with Pak...

L K Advani made the intriguing statement in the US recently when he said that we have to 8220;give and take8221; to achieve peace with Pakistan. Pakistan watchers are trying to decode what the home minister had meant. Senior BJP leaders say that he was trying to convey India8217;s readiness to accept the status quo as a possible solution8212;that the POK remains with Pakistan and Jammu and Kashmir with India, with the LoC getting converted into the international border.

The idea of the LoC as a border is as old as the J038;K problem. The new element is the changed geo-political context after 911 and the emergence of a lone superpower not shy of exercising the military option unilaterally and the rise of neo-cons as the driving force within its policy establishment. It is hardly a secret that a post-Iraq US is nudging both India and Pakistan to get on with it, and there is also a growing feeling in Washington that a solution need not entail changing the geography of Kashmir.

At various moments over the last 50 years, both Indian and Pakistani leaders have come close to accepting the LoC as a solution. But their plans did not take off because they did not have the courage to sell it to their people.

The first initiative, say old-timers in the Congress, was taken by Ghulam Mohammed, Pakistan8217;s governor-general, in the mid-fifties. He had come to Delhi, along with Dr Khan Saheb, a minister in the Pakistan government. They are believed to have persuaded Nehru, informally, to accept the LoC as the international border. But nothing came of the effort.

The Tashkent agreement under Shastri provided for the withdrawal of Indian forces from the POK, which meant respecting the LoC. In Simla, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Indira Gandhi also came to accept the LoC as the border but Bhutto sought time to put it across to his people and managed to get Mrs Gandhi to release thousands of Pakistani POWs as a goodwill gesture.

Now that Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee has come back after a very successful visit to China, he should turn his attention once again to Pakistan. Globally, the situation could not be more favourable. Domestically, such a conducive confluence of forces may not occur for a long time. Indeed, if there is anyone who could swing a breakthrough with Pakistan, it is Vajpayee8212;despite the failure of Lahore and Agra. It would be very difficult for a Congress, if it were to come to power after the 2004 polls, to bring about such a thaw. The BJP in the opposition would not allow it. The same is not the case today. The Congress is committed to a dialogue with Pakistan. Besides, improved ties with Pakistan would defuse communal tensions and secular parties would find it difficult to oppose such efforts.

Like Vajpayee, Musharraf is the man of the moment. For all the problems he may face from the armed forces, he is better placed than his predecessors to take the army along. Let8217;s be clear. The Pakistani army has to be given a stake in peace. No solution between India and Pakistan will be possible until either the army8217;s role in Pakistan is reduced, or it is brought on board.

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Here then is a real window of opportunity. If this moment is not seized, both nations would have lost out. Realpolitik apart, Vajpayee captured the essence of the moment when he announced his willingness to talk to Pakistan again in April. His move had initially stunned both the BJP and the MEA and although the RSS did not oppose his initiative, publicly, reservations over it were expressed in Sangh circles.

India has long been a factor in Pakistani elections, but Pakistan became an issue in Indian elections only after Kargil. The BJP used it to come back to power in the 1999 Lok Sabha elections, and it was again used to the hilt in last year8217;s Gujarat polls. Undoubtedly, the public mood against Pakistan toughened after the Lahore-Kargil-Agra fiascos.

It is, therefore, prudent for the government to move slowly, opting for a bottom up approach, rather than a summit down one. Just as a political party has to respond to public mood, it can also help create the mood. The success of Vajpayee8217;s gambit will depend on the extent to which he and Advani can move in tandem. Even though Advani8217;s clout with the RSS brass is diminished, he is still in a better position to persuade the Parivar.

The 8220;Vikas Purush-Lauh Purush8221; controversy was particularly unfortunate, given this crucial moment in the history of the subcontinent. At stake is how history will remember Atal Behari Vajpayee and Lal Krishan Advani. Will they be able to move together in solving Ayodhya and de-escalating tensions with Pakistan? Will they go down a road that could, ultimately, lead to a solution to Kashmir?