Tipnis146;s outburst is extremely useful

Provided it causes a rethink on security decision-making at the highest level

Ay tipnis, who was chief of air staff during the Kargil intrusions by the Pakistani army in early May 1999, has gone public on the delay in actions taken to meet the Kargil intrusions with air support in the October issue of the Force magazine. He has courageously bared names and conversations of all the secret parleys that took place between the chiefs and vice-chiefs of the Armed Forces until May 24, including their interaction with National Security Advisor NAC Brajesh Mishra, and External Affairs Minister EAM Jaswant Singh. The matter appears to have finally been discussed with Prime Minister Vajpayee for the first time in a CCS meeting that was held only on May 25. The PM decisively gave his approval that day to the deployment of air power along the LoC.

Tipnis8217;s outburst reveals the inherent weaknesses in decision-making in India8217;s higher military command. It also puts in focus the diffused way security responsibilities are divided between the three chiefs with no single head to coalesce the collective Services viewpoint.

The starting point of the action to unleash India8217;s aerial might, according to Tipnis, actually began on May 9, when his vice-chief, Brar, informed him that the Intelligence people had inputs that the army was in some sort of difficulty in the Kargil area, but that the Northern Army Command8217;s GOC-in-C, Lt Gen Pal, was away on leave, and the IAF AOC, J038;K, in Srinagar had not been informed of anything untoward. In New Delhi, the army chief and chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee COSC, General V.P. Malik, was abroad, and Lt Gen Chandrashekar was officiating as army chief while Admiral Sushil Kumar was officiating as the COSC. It seems only telephonic talks took place between the vice-chiefs and, on May 14, Chandrashekar met the air chief and told him the army could throw out the intruders but asked for attack helicopter support. The air chief was reluctant to accede to this without government approval. In a COSC meeting on May 16, called at the behest of the air chief and which irritated the naval chief, it was decided not to approach the government but maintain status quo. In another meeting on May 17, the NSA wanted status quo to be maintained on the use of air power. In the CCS meeting on the 18th, Jaswant Singh suggested status quo be maintained on the use of the air force as he was also to travel abroad, and this would internationalise the issue.

The government can now do one of two things. It can rap the knuckles of the former air chief under the antiquated Official Secrets Act 1923 for divulging sensitive information. Such action is unlikely since it would only highlight the parlous state of decision-making in the higher command. The government8217;s other, and more sensible, course is to study the lacunae in the decision-making levels, so that India8217;s security interests are safeguarded.

The writer is a defence analyst and former director of Naval Intelligence and Operations in Naval Headquarters