Tibetan touchstone

The Dalai Lama8217;s envoys admit having had cordial talks with Beijing but also acknowledge serious differences. The talks appear to focus on confidence-building rather than the resolution of the basic question on Tibet8217;s status within China. Although the Dalai Lama appears ready to settle for 8220;genuine autonomy8221; within a limited area of Tibet, Beijing seems unconvinced. The new Communist Party secretary of Tibet, Zhang Qingli, described Dalai8217;s 8220;Middle Path Approach8221; as nothing more than a 8220;swindle8221; and also described the battle against him as a 8220;fight to death8221;.

An early compromise seems unlikely though there are compelling reasons for both sides to reach a negotiated settlement. Inter alia, three major events have shaped the Dalai8217;s position: a India8217;s changed position on Tibet made explicit during Atal Bihari Vajpayee8217;s visit to China 2003 and the altered the nature of Tibetan resistance, which undermined Dalai Lama8217;s leadership amongst Tibetans; b the Karmapa8217;s emergence; and c the completion of the railway line to Lhasa, which has strengthened Beijing8217;s hold on Tibet.

The Dalai Lama is embarked on a twin-track that simultaneously explores conciliation with Beijing and mounts political pressure on China through the West. In March, he went one step ahead to say that he is willing to make a pilgrimage to China and see for himself the changes in the country. Beijing did not dismiss the proposal, saying in April that 8220;as long as the Dalai Lama makes it clear that he has completely abandoned Tibetan 8216;independence8217;, it is not impossible for us to consider his visit.8221;

Many feel that China might strike a deal ahead of the Beijing Olympics in 2008. Beijing8217;s change of mind also includes greater tolerance for religious practices. A recent case in point is the World Buddhist Forum being held this April in China8217;s Zhejiang Province, the first such event since 1947, with enthusiastic support from the government. But the Dalai was kept out of the show and the Panchen Lama, chosen by Beijing and rejected by the Dalai, projected as the spiritual leader of Tibet.

Some in China seem to believe that the demise of the aging Dalai would dissipate the resistance and that it would be best to play a waiting game. However, both sides are also aware that the power vacuum in the post-Dalai era could encourage both schisms within the Tibetan community as well as allow radicals to take charge. But there8217;s another factor to be considered. The Dalai Lama continues to seek support from the West. The Bush administration has shown tremendous interest in the Tibetan issue. Last month President Bush signed into law a bill to present the Dalai Lama the highest honour bestowed by the US Congress. This caused outrage in Beijing.

At the same time, there are expectations that President Hu could engineer big changes in China8217;s Tibet policy. He is the only Chinese leader to attain such high office after having served in Tibet as the party boss. If Jiang Zemin gained distinction for resolving the Hong Kong issue, there could be reason to believe that Hu could forge a breakthrough on Tibet.

Meanwhile, it would be interesting to watch whether the UPA government will revive the so-called 8216;Tibetan card8217; vis-a-vis China, given up by New Delhi since the late 1980s. If that happens it is unlikely to be a part of a policy reversal but more on account of a better comfort level between Beijing and the present dispensation in New Delhi. As this newspaper reported on Monday, New Delhi and the Tibetan government-in-exile have taken a decision to update each other on their respective talks with Beijing.

Beijing would favourably view the present formation in New Delhi that is dominated by Left parties, whose commitment to improve Sino-Indian relations is unconditional. China might also calculate that a Dalai Lama remaining under New Delhi8217;s control is better than his being hijacked by western powers. In any event Beijing would want strong reassurances from India that it no longer wishes to play the Tibetan card as a pre-condition for a final settlement of the boundary dispute. In recent years the Chinese have shown inclination to bring the Dalai factor into negotiations on the boundary question that are at a crucial stage and are focused on the Tawang tract in Arunachal Pradesh.

Chinese writings have lately been referring to Tawang8217;s importance as the birthplace of the Sixth Dalai Lama in 1683. India, of course, is not in a position to part with Tawang. Interestingly, the position of Tibetans on Tawang is also not clear. When he visited Arunachal in 2003, the Dalai Lama reportedly referred to Tawang as part of Tibet, if only obliquely.

Any success of the current China-Dalai Lama dialogue or, for that matter, the Sino-Indian boundary negotiations depends on the Tibetan position on Tawang. Tibetans cannot take the position that Tawang is not part of Tibet. As the noted expert on Sino-Indian relations, John Garver, argues, Tawang8217;s importance to China lay in its capacity to sustain one-third of the Tibetan economy and its strategic proximity to the Northeast and the Bay of Bengal.

To resolve their boundary dispute, China and India need to find a creative approach to the Tawang question. It should be evident, however, that no out-of-the-box idea on Tawang will stick unless it is blessed by the Dalai Lama. In that sense the Dalai Lama matters more than ever to both India and China.

The writer is director of the Centre for Strategic and Regional Studies, University of Jammu