The truth, without serum

The voluminous charge sheet filed by Mumbai8217;s anti-terrorist squad last November holds few answers to any of these questions. It lists at least eight accused as Pakistanis with only first names and without addresses or other details. The main accused, Faisal Sheikh, his brother Muzamil, Sohail Sheikh and Tanveer Ansari did train in Pakistan during 2002-2004 under the tutelage of Lashkar8217;s planner and accused, Azam Cheema, and the Mumbai cadres were in touch with him. But investigators are still to crack the whole terrorist operation, including the involvement of SIMI general secretary Ehtesham Siddiqui, who did not go to Pakistan or train in the handling of explosives.

The Mumbai explosions are part of a larger narrative, including the blasts at Varanasi, New Delhi and Hyderabad. Each of these remains unsolved, and yet the UPA government appears satisfied with the perfunctory charge sheets filed. To date, there is no clarity on who actually targeted Varanasi8217;s Sankat Mochan temple, Delhi8217;s Sarojini Nagar market, Samjhauta Express near Panipat, Malegoan8217;s masjid or Hyderabad8217;s Mecca Masjid. Contrast this with the speed with which the conspiracies behind the 7/7 London bombings and the recent failed attack in Glasgow were uncovered.

For the UPA, internal security is visibly a low priority, with emphasis on gathering political intelligence to handle the whims of political allies, particularly the Left. The basic instruments set up on the recommendation of the Kargil Group of Ministers 8212; like the multi-agency centre or joint task force on intelligence for increased coordination between the Centre and states 8212; have been downgraded or simply not put to optimal use. This coupled with low capability and overt reliance on technical intelligence and barbiturates has almost taken the fight out of security personnel.

Consider the decade8217;s terrorist incidents. Apart from terrorist strikes in disturbed areas of J038;K and the Northeast, 2000 had no incident; 2001 Parliament attack; 2002 American Culture Centre, Kolkata, and Akshardham, Gandhinagar; 2003 nil; 2004 nil; 2005 Ayodhya, Mumbai, Sharmjeevi Express, New Delhi, and IISc, Bangalore, 2006 Varanasi, Mumbai and Malegaon; and 2007 Samjhauta Express, Mecca Masjid and Gorakhpur. The alarming aspect is that among these, culprits were identified and justice delivered in only the attacks on Parliament, the American Centre and Akshardham.

A telling example of the capability of the internal security establishment is the investigation in the Samajhauta Express blasts of February 19, 2007. Haryana Police obtained leads that the terrorists had brought the basic material for the fire-bombs in Indore and moved towards New Delhi on February 14. Beyond this there is no clarity on what happened, and to date the investigators are grappling with numerous mobile phone calls made between New Delhi and Indore. The failure to infiltrate the jehadi terror apparatus and this absolute reliance on hands-off technical intelligence, so as not to antagonise prospective vote banks of the political masters, has led to the current situation where terrorists strike at regular intervals with impunity and there is lethargic response, if any, from the authorities.

It is only logical to assume that since all investigations are in bits and pieces, the truth may perhaps lie in an altogether different direction. A matter of record is that an influential section within the internal security establishment had a diametrically opposite view of the Mumbai blasts perpetrators, but these voices were silenced once National Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan singled out the LeT in the cabinet meeting two days after the incident.

The current drift is connected to the functioning of the UPA government. For all his good intentions, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has little time for internal security his advisors boast that the PM does not need to meet the IB chief daily as he knows what the super sleuth will tell him and has virtually outsourced it to Home Minister Shivraj Patil and Narayanan. Now, Patil is the right minister in the wrong portfolio 8212; as can be seen from the fact that when all of Rajasthan was paralysed by the Gurjjar-Meena clashes on account of an inept state government, he was totally against central intervention and said so politely in a cabinet meeting. Narayanan, for all his sharp operational capabilities, has not been able to insulate internal security from the politics of the day. This is evident from the episodic responses on ULFA, Naxalites, separatist dialogue in J038;K or the India-Pakistan joint anti-terror mechanism. These days the government is rather more keen on using intelligence for anti-Pratibha Patil stories that are likely to appear in the media than on finding perpetrators of terrorist attacks.

But with Indians coming on the radar of global jehadi terror, the UPA government cannot afford to keep looking the other way. No longer can the government pressure the police to go slow on investigations as it may offend a particular community. Remember the affidavits families of suspects in the Mumbai blasts investigation filed alleging harassment by the police. And consider how unprepared India is in the fight against terror, given Indian intelligence8217;s cluelessness about the pan-Islamic linkages of Kafeel and Sabeel Ahmed.

The Central government needs to dust up an April 2004 file on the setting up of a central law enforcement agency by introducing federal offences into the Union list. This will ensure that the Centre need not obtain permission from the states to tackle federal crimes like terrorist attacks or bomb blasts. It needs to marry institutionalised memory with contemporary intelligence on terror networks and activate its human intelligence capabilities rather than rely on half-baked gossip on the golf courses frequented by the intelligence masters or by using truth serum. In short, build the capability to surprise the terrorists. Past attacks must be worked out expeditiously and perpetrators punished so as to preempt future strikes. Anything less would send out a message of encouragement to terrorists.