The Foreign Hand

WHEN a handful of journalists determined to set government agenda, wrote soon after the BJP came to power in March 1998 that it had decided ...

WHEN a handful of journalists determined to set government agenda, wrote soon after the BJP came to power in March 1998 that it had decided to abandon its nuclear and missile programme, there was an eloquent silence on the part of the new government. Then Brajesh Mishra, still to become A.B. Vajpayee8217;s Principal Secretary and amongst the most powerful men in New Delhi, spoke. Denying the planted media stories, Mishra pointed out that the BJP would live up to its election manifesto. India would take its rightful place among the world8217;s most powerful nations. Six weeks later, on May 11 and 13, the Pokharan tests had taken place.

For the last six years, Mishra has articulated his passion for foreign affairs by setting foreign policy. Schooled in the Nehruvian Foreign Service, Mishra has in many ways completely overhauled Nehru8217;s school of thought, in other ways brought it to its logical conclusion. Mishra himself will deny that the country8217;s nuclear weapons programme, for example, were an expression of the BJP8217;s right-wing philosophy. He has pointed out that it was actually Nehru who started the programme and that every subsequent government pushed it forward. All the BJP did was to summon the courage to come out of the closet.

That pathbreaking determination has been evident these past years, never more so vis-a-vis China and Pakistan. Sources point out that on the eve of the PM8217;s visit to China in June 2003, there was little agreement in New Delhi over the distance the government should travel to do a 8216;8216;deal8217;8217; with Beijing. Many felt that acknowledging the Tibet Autonomous Region as being a part of the PRC was much too much for a Chinese recognition of Sikkim8212; especially since Sikkim was already a part of India. But with the Prime Minister keen on improving relations with its very rich and powerful eastern neighbour, keen on showing Beijing that despite its lesser socio-economic indicators India was no pushover, and interested in leveraging a new Sino-Indian relationship with the rest of the world, the contours of a new idea was called for. Brajesh Mishra pulled the hat out of the bag. New Delhi proposed the institution of 8216;8216;Special Representatives8217;8217; to settle the lingering boundary problem that has cast a long shadow over the relationship for the last 40 years.

Mishra8217;s intimacy with China goes back over three decades, when he was posted to Beijing as India8217;s charge d8217;affaires from 1970-72. As part of the diplomatic brigade that lined up to greet Mao Ze Dong on Tiananmen square, the story goes that Mao stopped in front of Mishra, smiled and said he hoped India and China would soon become friends again. Considering that Mao had barely shown a flicker of recognition when most other envoys had passed in front of him, Mishra8217;s brush with fame became an integral part of Sino-Indian folklore.

Ten years later, posted to New York as India8217;s permanent representative to the UN in 1979, Mishra was once again in the thick of things. Charan Singh as PM had just ordered that India criticize the December 1970 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Within weeks, the Indira Gandhi government was back in power, was far more reluctant to do so and Mishra was asked to change his statement. He did, but exited the Foreign Service soon after by taking up a UN assignment. He retired from the IFS a few years later. By the early 90s he had joined the BJP and was put in charge of its foreign affairs cell.

Last week8217;s historic accord in Islamabad only underscores Mishra8217;s importance as the PM8217;s favoured trouble-shooter who intimately connects with his vision of peace. Overruling the MEA8217;s precondition that talks with Pakistan could only be held after the last terrorist was either killed or stopped crossing the LoC, Mishra underwrote a deal in which putting down the gun was concomitant with a return to dialogue. Once again, Mishra was articulating Vajpayee8217;s belief in India being bigger than the BJP. And that, on the eve of national elections, it was far more important to get closure on the 56-year-old trauma of Partition, than to worry about a handful of lost right-wing votes.