Signals from Hardoi

How many more rail accidents does the Indian Railways need to get it to read the signals right? At least three major train accidents within ...

How many more rail accidents does the Indian Railways need to get it to read the signals right? At least three major train accidents within the last two and a half years have been caused by its personnel either misreading or overlooking crucial signals. In August 1995, a switchman allowed the Purushottam Express to pass through Firozabad station even as the Kalindi Express had stalled a few metres ahead. That tragedy claimed over 400 lives. Two years later, the Karnataka Express overshot a red signal near Faridabad and rushed straight into the rear of the Himsagar Express. In the disaster that occurred on Monday night, 12 km from Hardoi, the driver of the Bareilly-Varanasi passenger train, after having apparently failed to notice the red signal at Karna station, rammed the Kashi Vishwanath Express that had halted a little ahead, causing the death of at least 70 people.

At one point of time the Railways in this country had a justly earned reputation of managing a complex network in a relatively safe and efficient manner. Today, that is history. While the old ways of handling rail traffic are forgotten, the new communications technology is evidently not being properly utilised. An efficient signal system has long been a crucially felt need of the Indian Railways. After the Firozabad collision, the specially constituted Railway Convention Committee had recommended that the main thrust of the Railways must be on the upgradation of its signalling and communications systems. While the cardinal purpose of such a measure is to prevent accidents, it also helps optimise the use of rolling stock and track capacity. That same year, a wide-scale automation of railway signalling was announced and Rs 15 lakh was provided for every station to modernise its signalling devices. Ironically, the Hardoi section that was witness to the recent tragedy, was equipped with an automatic interlocking system, which is meant to ensure that the green signal comes on only when the earlier train had already crossed the next railway station. Only an inquiry will reveal whether this device had failed for some reason, but it goes to highlight the need for efficient fail-safe signalling devices that could check possible human error. As old railway hands are fond of stating, sophisticated signalling devices and centralised traffic control will fail, if sound operating rules are flouted.

This leads up to the most important component in any safety system: the personnel. In August 1993, the Railway Board had asked the various zonal railways to screen their drivers with less than ten years of experience. The results were edifying, to say the least. At least a quarter of them had only a very hazy idea of safety measures. Also it is common knowledge that many engine drivers often work in an inebriated state although, according to the rule book, this must never be the case. Fatigue and alcohol are two of the most common factors behind tragedies of this kind. Yet, the Indian Railways continues to miss the signals, even as it trundles along.