Separation is not rocket science

Between none and all

How many of these should be made eligible for safeguards? Diehard fundamentalists in the nuclear establishment in India would say 8220;none8221; citing the indigenous nature of these reactors. Diehard nonproliferationalist fundamentalists in the US would say 8220;all8221; citing the proliferation potential of these reactors. Both are wrong.

The stated Indian nuclear doctrine of minimum credible deterrence does not require India to use the spent fuel from all 11 plants to sustain its minimum nuclear deterrent. But neither can it afford to place all under safeguards. In the listing of civil reactors India will have to take into account, one, the fact that even the smaller of its nuclear capable neighbours has a weapons usable fissile material production capability that exceeds India8217;s own capabilities, with its limited strategic programme dedicated facilities, and, two, these two neighbours have had very active collaboration on strategic nuclear programmes. Indeed one of Pakistan8217;s strategic nuclear programme facilities was built with Chinese assistance. These two factors would degrade India8217;s capabilities to maintain its nuclear deterrence 8212; within the constraints of its nuclear doctrine 8212; with its current dedicated strategic programme facilities.

It would, thus, be necessary for India to keep out of its civilian facilities list two or more currently electricity producing reactors, preferably four to take care of contingencies, and dedicate them for production purposes, if necessary. This may not entirely match the annual accretion of fissile material by both neighbours, it will ensure there8217;s no degradation of the Indian deterrence.

Thus the Indian list of civil power reactors should be somewhere between zero and seven.

The exclusion principle

What about research reactors? The two strategically relevant reactors Dhruva and CIRUS will have to be kept out of safeguards. What about the other three? There is to be a misconception in India amongst nuclear scientists and laymen that IAEA safeguards don8217;t apply to research reactors. When the US was debating its safeguards agreement with IAEA, there were suggestions and requests to exclude research reactors. The authorities turned them down stating that 8220;inasmuch as the Agreement applies as do all international safeguards generally to nuclear materials at reactors without regard to their character. Indeed, research reactors often utilise, as fuel, uranium of a relatively high enrichment; accordingly, they may have substantial significance from the standpoint of an international safeguards regime.8221;

The IAEA too in its definition of facilities refers only to reactors without reference to their nature. It would be difficult for the US or IAEA to make an exception in case of India by leaving research reactors out of safeguards. It would be a different matter, if India was to claim that these reactors are required for its strategic programme.

Consider the reactors under construction including the PFBR prototype fast breeder reactor. There are eight under construction 8212; five pressurised heavy water reactors PHWR, two light water reactors LWR and one PFBR. The LWRs, built with Russian help, are already covered by an existing IAEA safeguards agreement. Given that only about four PHWRs would be needed to maintain India8217;s minimum deterrence, the five PHWRs under construction can be made eligible for safeguards. It must be understood that these would actually come under IAEA safeguards only when fissile material is introduced in the reactors, some time between 2007 and 2009. By then India would be in a better position to analyse the implications of the Indo-US nuclear agreement for its energy programme.

What is a PRBR?

That leaves the PFBR. So far there8217;s been no suggestion the PFBR is essential for India8217;s strategic programme 8212; that is, as a source of fissile material for weapons purposes. With a capacity of 500 MW it is meant to be connected to the electrical grid as a source of energy. When considering application of safeguards on reactors, IAEA makes no distinction between power and non-power reactors, even in case of the safeguards agreements it has with the NPT defined Nuclear Weapon States NWS. In case of NWS it makes a distinction only between facilities, including reactors, connected with national security objectives and others 8212; that is, between military and civil reactors, not civilian power and non-power reactors. Therefore, unless India makes the claim that the PFBR is meant for military purposes, it would be in weak position to claim a special status for the PFBR on the basis of its research and development status.

Other reasons can be put forward for excluding the PFBR from the safeguards list. It is slated to be loaded with unsafeguarded plutonium Pu from the current Indian inventory of such fissile material. The initial loading will form a substantial portion. Since the pact is silent on the disposition of the Indian inventory of unsafeguarded Pu 8212; implicitly accepting that such material need not be covered by IAEA safeguards 8212; putting the PFBR under IAEA safeguards will automatically bring that amount of unsafeguarded PU under IAEA safeguards. That8217;d have an indirect effect of reducing the inventory of Pu available to India for strategic purposes.

However, this rationale would lose its validity if members of the NSG agree to supply Pu for the Indian FBR programme. Then, the Indian inventory of un-safeguarded fissile material available for its strategic programme will remain unaffected and the US-NSG desire to have the FBRs, potentially unlimited sources of Pu and hence unlimited size of nuclear arsenal, are brought under safeguards as a measure of confidence on the Indian doctrine of minimum deterrence. Therefore, if there is a scope for sourcing Pu for the FBR programme from external sources, there would be no reason not to put the FBR under safeguards from the national security viewpoint. Indeed putting the FBRs under safeguards under these conditions will accelerate the contribution of FBRs to the Indian energy scenario given the limitations on the availability of unsafeguarded Pu if the FBRs are kept out of safeguards and except for a handful of PHWRs, the only indigenous source of such material, all others are under safeguards.

Need-to-know basis

News reports suggest the Indian nuclear establishment is averse to putting the PFBR under safeguards because of its R038;D nature and related intellectual property rights implications. This was, not surprisingly, the subject of intense discussion in the US at the time of its safeguards agreement with IAEA. First, there is Article 5 of the IAEA statute that requires the Agency 8220;to take every precaution to protect commercial and industrial secrets and other confidential information coming to its knowledge8221;. Such information is subject to special handling procedures which limit access on a strict 8220;need to know8221; basis. At the time of appointment, Agency personnel sign a document, obligating them not to disclose any confidential or propriety information.

Besides, it is open to the Government of India to appoint a neutral agency, in this case perhaps the Atomic Energy Regulatory Authority, which will be the agency to supply the IAEA the information it may seek in respect of any installation for implementing its safeguards procedures and practices. The bottomline is, the IAEA would require, and be provided, information only where such information is necessary for it to make its determinations on its safeguards on the facility concerned. Therefore with proper regulatory practices by AERB, a body independent of the DAE scientists and engineers, the government can ensure that DAE8217;s proprietary and IPRs are well protected.

Therefore, unless national security reasons in respect of India8217;s strategic programme can be cited there is no justification for excluding the Fast Breeder Reactors from facilities eligible for IAEA safeguards.

G. Balachandran is a technology consultant specialising in nuclear and export-control issues