Revolution meets confusion

When his words rang so true, we called him again. Less forthcoming, he would only say that those in power in Delhi must remember that Jehanabad happened when Bihar is under Central rule.

What, in specifics, must our rulers in Delhi remember? For one thing, that the sins of Andhra Pradesh 8211; successive state governments playing footsie with the People8217;s War, switching on and off police operations, with predictable consequences on efficiency and morale 8212; began visiting Bihar in the early Nineties. Understanding that requires some detail, perhaps more detail than Delhi is used to dealing with when it comes to Naxalites.

The People8217;s War in the early Nineties had a new leader in Muppalla Lakshmana Rao, aka, Ganapathy. Rao had replaced founder-leader Kondapalli Seetharamaiah. The PW had a plan ready but it required the red star to start shining over Bihar, then undivided.

So, there was a merger that masked the ambition for an acquisition. The PW merged with the CPIM-L; Party Unity. Rivals in the revolutionary business were the Maoist Communist Centre MCC, then the dominant left extremists in Bihar. PW, however, never took the rivalry to the point of starting a comrade-vs-comrade battle of attrition.

With state governments at best being apathetic about the Naxalite problem, PW began working on the MCC. The big prize came with the formation of an international revolutionary cartel 8212; in July 2001, nine extreme left outfits from India, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka floated CCOMPOSA Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisations in South Asia.

CCOMPOSA is not a flight of Maoist fancy. MCC, which had confined itself to south and central districts of undivided Bihar, was tasked by CCOMPOSA to build the Red bridge to Nepal.

Getting MCC fully on board was crucial for PW. MCC cadres fanned out north, settling down along the highly Porous, 735 km-long Indo-Nepal border. Today, the MCC8217;s presence is not confined to Gaya, Aurangabad and Rohtas: its pawmarks are all over north Bihar, in east and west Champaran, Sitamarhi, Darbhanga, Madhubani, Sheohar and Muzaffarpur.

PW-MCC became a serious security threat 8212; for the officers on the ground, not their masters, or not all their masters. In April 2004, Delhi got Washington to include the PW and MCC in the latter8217;s Terror Exclusion List. Weeks later, the new Congress government in Andhra Pradesh announced that it was opening talks with the PW. Anti-Naxal operations were called off.

The PW-MCC merger happened as the talks started. The new CPI Maoist ran rings around the YSR Reddy government and it ran operations from and to Nepal. Nepal Maoist shelters have reportedly sprung up in Champaran forests.

That should have sent Delhi reaching for a new strategy. But perhaps some politicians don8217;t see Naxalites as an 8220;immediate threat8221;.

Sounds astounding? This came from the PW man, Vara Vara Rao, who headed the extremists8217; delegation at the Andhra talks. The Naxalites may not be seeking 8220;an immediate transfer of power8221;, as Rao was so generous in pointing out. But how is storming jails and paralysing government machinery a lesser threat? And how far will parts of Naxalite-infested India have to go before authorities wake up?

As far as Dandakaranya? The vast stretch, from north Telengana to Chhattisgarh, is so much under PW control that the group is ready to declare it a 8220;liberated zone8221;.

That8217;s different, in Naxalite jargon, from 8220;primary guerrilla zone8221;. The latter means Bihar and Jharkhand, where Naxalites 8220;engage the state8221;. Perhaps, Jehanabad should be reclassified 8212; the state didn8217;t quite engage itself there.

Ask the cops on the beat how ineffectual the state8217;s engagement is. Policemen consider stints in Naxalite-affected areas as 8220;punishment postings8221;. Those who do try and perform according to their remit often do not have the means.

Take this example: When the Reddy government called off its anti-Naxalite operations in Andhra, the police in the Gadhiroli district of neighbouring Maharashtra borrowed an anti-mines vehicle from the Andhra police. The police in the state don8217;t have basic equipment.

Central forces are better equipped. But rushing Central battalions doesn8217;t work.

Naxalites operate in small groups over usually difficult terrain. A paramilitary battalion, rushed into an area they don8217;t know, unable to gather local intelligence, can8217;t track down and fight Naxalites. Plus, when the Centre says it is sending a battalion, what it means that it is sending, on an average, only around 400 fighting men. The rest of the battalion are support staff.

If the Centre keeps sending troops, it may soon get a thank-you note from the Reds. What will make the Naxalites apprehensive is an extensive network of police stations. Capable officers 8212; there are quite a few of them 8212; should head these police stations and be allowed to develop local intelligence. They must be given considerable operational latitude and they must have complete political backing.

Police officers who have fought Naxalites under state-sponsored difficult situations always insist that under such a operational set up8212;small, effective, well-informed and well-equipped police forces engage Naxalites locally 8212; the extremist groups will face a real challenge.

How many more Jehanabads before Delhi gets it?