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This is an archive article published on September 3, 2008

RBI146;s still temporary

Why is it that India still awaits a proper central bank?

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In post-reform India, the preamble to the RBI Act of 1934 has been quoted several times. But it is worth quoting yet again: 8220;And whereas in the present disorganisation of the monetary systems of the world it is not possible to determine what will be suitable as a permanent basis for the Indian monetary system; but whereas it is expedient to make temporary provision on the basis of the existing monetary system, and to leave the question of the monetary standard best suited to India to be considered when the international monetary position has become sufficiently clear and stable to make it possible to frame permanent measures8230;8221; Et cetera.

The RBI Act may have been amended several times. But the preamble continues unchanged. Ipso facto, RBI is still a temporary institution and we still don8217;t know what a permanent central bank should be. RBI is a central bank and in any country a central bank8217;s primary role is monetary policy, which it should pursue independently, though different gradations and definitions of independence are possible. Note, one isn8217;t talking about the Bank of England, the European Central Bank or the US Federal Reserve alone. The People8217;s Bank of China is far more independent than RBI is.

According to media reports, two claimants for the RBI governor8217;s post were interviewed by the finance minister and a decision taken. This is a far cry from the chairman of the Federal Reserve being confirmed by the Congress. Alternatively, ask the question as to who constitutes RBI8217;s board of directors and how independent this board is. Should banking supervision be under RBI or is that best done through an independent government agency? Can monetary and exchange rate policy ever become independent if public debt management remains RBI8217;s primary focus? Even if one forgets earlier committees including Tarapore-II on convertibility, there have been two recent reports 8212; the Planning Commission-sponsored Raghuram Rajan RR committee on financial sector reforms and the Percy Mistry PM committee on making Mumbai an international financial centre. Much has been made of why two different committees were needed and the nitty-gritty of their recommendations. RR sounded less radical and more politically correct than PM. However, both agreed on reforming RBI. PM documented RBI8217;s control mindset. RR said it was inevitable if RBI was entrusted with public debt management, requiring government banks and control on private sector entry. The language and sequencing might be different, but PM and RR were barking up the same tree.

For instance, even RR flagged unnecessary intervention in forex markets, the move of some regulation to SEBI and the required shift to inflation-targeting. Though not quite articulated in that fashion, RR also agrees with PM8217;s points that financial markets banking, insurance, capital markets, asset management, derivatives should not be artificially fragmented, segmented and compartmentalised. The UPA is close to its full term and has been unable to move on financial sector reforms pensions, insurance, voting rights to foreign investors in banks. A quote from RR is in order: 8220;Clearly, there is little urgency for reforms because India is not in a crisis. This is where the political leadership is of essence. Reforming in crisis is similar to driving with a gun to your head 8212; you pay more attention, but there is much greater risk of accidents.8221;

The argument that with the Left out of the way, financial sector reforms will move is a non-starter. That8217;s certainly not the case where legislative changes are necessary. However, not everything requires changes in legislation. RBI8217;s exchange rate management limits on external commercial borrowings, prevention of rupee appreciation is one instance. The independent debt management office is another. It is true that North Block is reluctant to let go of RBI and exchange and interest rate policies have been influenced, if not determined, by the finance ministry.

However, independent debt management office is different, probably because this will be located in the finance ministry. But wherever it is located, this is a desirable move, since interest rates then become a true monetary policy instrument, and some upward pressure on interest rates is reduced. Fiscal deficits though they hide several off-budget items and FRBM targets are healthy enough for this transition to be possible. Before a full-fledged and independent debt management office, the intermediary proposal was of a middle-office in the finance ministry. Stated differently, North Block wanted this reform, even if it didn8217;t want others and RBI under Y.V. Reddy didn8217;t seem very keen. Earlier, under Bimal Jalan 1997-2003, the argument was that public debt management couldn8217;t be de-linked from monetary policy as long as deficits were high. Subject to the caveat mentioned, that8217;s no longer a valid argument.

This is what RBI has to say on its governors: 8220;Few personalities are so close to and yet so distant from India8217;s populace as the governor of the Reserve Bank and few evocative of his awe and mystique: close, because virtually every individual, be he ever so poor or so rich, carries on his person the promise and signature of the governor. Awe, they command as the custodian of the country8217;s reserves and defenders of the external value of the currency. And mystique, they possess as purveyors of money, the commodity all desire but so few understand.8221;

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Everyone may not understand money. But everyone understands notions of transparency and independence. Perhaps because of the distance and mystique, ranking RBI governors isn8217;t as common as ranking FMs. However, if you judge by RBI8217;s own website on its governors, reforms are flagged more under C. Rangarajan 1992-97 and Bimal Jalan 1997-2003 than under Y.V. Reddy 2003-08. Reddy8217;s listings are more personal accomplishments. Beyond rates which are manifestations, reforms unlike crisis management are the true test of any RBI governor8217;s success and this not only means banking reforms which have continuously occurred in incremental fashion, but also central banking reforms. RBI needs to re-invent itself and this is more difficult than managing crises, which is what P.C. Bhattacharya 1962-67 and S. Venkitaramanan 1990-92 had to undertake in different contexts. That re-invention could have happened under Y.V. Reddy, but didn8217;t, despite the India Shining GDP growth, forex reserves, low inflation earlier and low deficits story.

D. Subbarao8217;s 2008-11 yardstick for success will be this and it is unclear what one should make of a three-year term as opposed to a five-year one. Nor is it clear who might drive such reforms best 8212; someone from North Block, an insider from RBI or a complete outsider. Once RBI is de-constructed, perhaps selection processes will become more transparent and one will have more answers than questions.

The writer is a noted economist

expressexpressindia.com

 

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