Paramilitary is not peripheral

Kargil was a triumph. It was also a tragedy. It was a triumph of the Indian jawan, of his valour, and of his total commitment to the nati...

Kargil was a triumph. It was also a tragedy. It was a triumph of the Indian jawan, of his valour, and of his total commitment to the nation. It was a tragedy in the sense that the intrusions need not have taken place at all and that the resultant loss of precious lives was avoidable. The security establishment of the country, whatever the government might say, was caught napping, and by the time the Rip Van Winkle awoke after nearly four months, the enemy had dug in and fortified itself well inside the Indian territory.

Our failure was basically on two fronts: intelligence and operational. The government’s clean chit to the intelligence agencies is quite incomprehensible. If true, then why was military effort not mounted immediately thereafter and aggression halted at the LOC itself? The failure to respond promptly at the political and military levels becomes inexcusable in that case.

Operationally, it is the responsibility of the security forces to guard the LOC. If the troops had to withdraw during thewinter, why was there no aerial surveillance? Or, why were no long-range patrols sent? These are questions which the Committee headed by K. Subrahmanyam would have to address.

The total length of LOC in the state of J&K is 778 km. Out of this 489.05 is guarded by the Army and the rest 288.95 km by the Border Security Force. During the recent confrontation in Kargil, the 8th Battalion of the BSF was deployed in the Chorbatla, Kaksar and Chhainigund sub-sectors. It is significant that there was no intrusion in any of the FDLs (Forward Defended Localities) held by the BSF. The secret of this lay in the fact that none of the FDLs held by the BSF was vacated by them during the winter of 1998-99. Even the FDL at Chorbatla at a height of over 18,000 ft. was manned by the BSF jawans during the winter. The Chhainigund area was defended independently by BSF troops, who held their posts valiantly in the face of heavy shelling by the enemy.

These facts have somehow not been highlighted and are generally not known.The media has instead preferred to highlight the unfortunate killing of three Army personnel by a BSF constable in the Akhnoor sector. Here also the fact that a joint inquiry by a Brigadier and a Colonel of the Army and a Commandant of the BSF is in progress has gone virtually unreported. The media also played up the attack on the Bandipur campus of the BSF. The incident was no doubt a disgrace to the BSF, but in an insurgency situation, you cannot always stay on top. The best of forces have reverses. Let it not be forgotten that in J&K the BSF has so far annihilated 1,928 militants, apprehended 9,049 and recovered no less than 4,450 AK rifles. In the process, 529 BSF personnel have sacrificed their lives and 2,886 suffered injuries.

The performance of the Army jawan has been rightly and legitimately appreciated by the country. The bureaucratic establishment, which had always been chary of giving the jawan his due, may at last be forced to concede his rightful claims in terms of salary and allowances. Butit would be a sad day if the contribution of the borderman, who stood his ground even in the severest winter in the Himalayan heights, is not recognised.

The withdrawal of the Army from the internal security duties in the post-Kargil scenario is going to impose heavier responsibilities on the paramilitary forces, who would have to bear the entire brunt of militancy. The latest indications are quite disturbing. The militants have moved to hideouts in the high reaches of Pir Panjal Ranges, Hayen and Halmatpora (Kupwara), Vewan, Datiwas and Ajas Ranges of Bandipur, Lar area of Ganderbal, Wanimul and Khular Ranges of Kulgam, Kokarnag and Wadwan Ranges and Bodbangas jungles. They do not permit even the bakarwals to enter these places. Besides, the militants who earlier used to move in small groups of 5 to 7 are now moving in big groups of 30 to 40.

Story continues below this ad

We may have frustrated Pak designs in Kargil. But with the Army now tied do-wn along the LOC, militancy is already sh own signs of picking up and the paramilitaryforces are in for a tough time. Kargil may have calmed down, but as Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has threatened, “tomorrow the volcano can erupt somewhere else”. It seems Kargil was only a spark.

The writer is a former director-general of the BSF