On history146;s plateau

Repeatedly and unambiguously the Dalai Lama has stated that he wants 8220;genuine autonomy8221; for Tibet, not independence. But Chinese leaders go on calling him a separatist. One of them has even described him as a 8220;wolf in a monk8217;s clothing8221;.

Obviously, it is not mere arrogance of power that is motivating Beijing. It has good reasons to believe that its power 8212; military, economic and soft 8212; is having its effect. The Dalai Lama8217;s angry followers in India, still planning a march to the China border, have apparently been encouraged by the Speaker of the US House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi8217;s meeting with the Dalai Lama and her appeal to the 8220;world conscience8221; over Tibet. But what is all this worth, when President George W. Bush8217;s spokesperson reaffirms that he would attend the Olympics at Beijing? In any case, the economic and political stakes of the United States and the West in China are too complex to allow for the kind of boycott that was enforced at the time of the Moscow Olympics in 1980 because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Moreover, many 8212; not in China alone 8212; are asking whether China8217;s action in Tibet is different from that of the US in Iraq.

All things considered, this country8217;s reaction to the developments in Tibet has been unexceptionable. Like most other countries, it expressed its 8220;distress8221; and 8212; as it has done in the case of other chronic and painful conflicts such as the one in Palestine 8212;appealed to both sides to solve the problem through peaceful dialogue. Come to think of it, the statement of US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is mild by comparison. Yet the UPA government has drawn criticism 8212; especially from the principal opposition party, the BJP, as well as others 8212; that in relation to China8217;s 8220;unacceptable repression 8220; in Tibet it has been 8220;weak-kneed8221; and 8220;chicken hearted8221;. Even before the eruption in Lhasa, the government here was being charged with being 8220;slurred8221; and 8220;stilted8221; in replying to China8217;s aggressively asserted claims on Arunachal Pradesh, particularly the Tawang tract. This is a result partly of the inflamed polarisation of the Indian polity and partly of the complexity and delicacy of the country8217;s Tibet policy, right from the days of Jawaharlal Nehru, that has often been under fire, not always without reason.

Historically, Tibet had only a tributary relationship with the Chinese empire that never directly ruled it. On the other hand, not a single country had ever recognised Tibet to be sovereign. Ironically, it was Britain, then ruling India, which pushed Tibet into the Chinese orbit out of fear of Russia8217;s imperial designs. After the Younghusband Expedition to Lhasa 1904, British India on the one hand and Tibet and China on the other signed the Shimla Convention of 1914 that delineated the MacMahon Line.

After Indian independence and the Chinese Revolution, which were roughly simultaneous, things were bound to change 8212; and change they did. India8217;s initial reaction to the march of the People8217;s Liberation Army into Lhasa was sharp. China responded even more acrimoniously and refused to countenance any 8220;interference8221; in its internal affairs. No country in the world contested China8217;s claim. The British who had started the whole thing were the first to wash their hands of Tibet. They were worrying about Hong Kong! In the circumstances, India accepted the inevitable but insisted that Tibet8217;s autonomy be protected. The Chinese readily concurred and even signed an agreement with the young Dalai Lama in 1953, which they cynically reneged on.

In accepting the Chinese assurance on Tibetan autonomy, Nehru rejected the advice of Sardar Patel and Rajagopalachari then Union minister without portfolio for a 8220;clean break8221; with China, and ignored a 8220;vague hint8221; by the American ambassador, Loy Henderson, that the State Department would be 8220;glad to help, if asked8221;. Those who continue to curse Nehru for 8220;not resisting8221; the Chinese occupation of Tibet are talking nonsense. India did not have the power to do so, and was itself under heavy pressure at the UN over Kashmir where an uneasy cease-fire was in its early stages.

Nehru8217;s cardinal mistake, of course, was the 1954 agreement on the Tibet region of China, accepting Chinese sovereignty over 8220;autonomous Tibet8221; without any quid pro quo in terms of Chinese acceptance of this country8217;s 8220;long-settled8221;, 8220;long-established8221; border. This story of Nehru falling between the two stools of trusting and distrusting China and the Chinese successfully fooling the Indian side is much too complex and convoluted. In this, the role of then Indian ambassador to China, K.M. Panikkar, was not just disastrous but diabolical.

Almost all countries have accepted Tibet to be part of China. Under the circumstances, everyone has to walk a tightrope balancing one8217;s support to the cause of Tibetan autonomy and one8217;s relationship with China.

The Tibetan uprising of 1959, the Dalai Lama8217;s flight and the grant of asylum to him in this country inevitably worsened India-China relations. The brief but brutal 1962 war followed. The rest, as they say, is history.

The writer is a Delhi-based political commentator

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