Non-proliferators Inc

Nuclear proliferation has got everyone8217;s attention. As the bizarre details of clandestine networks that thrived despite multilateral no...

Nuclear proliferation has got everyone8217;s attention. As the bizarre details of clandestine networks that thrived despite multilateral non-proliferation arrangements, inspection regimes and export controls tumble out, the US as the self-appointed conscience keeper of the non-proliferation order is scrambling to darn the tattered fabric. The Bush administration has put forth seven proposals. But they are mere patchwork. The NPT, the anchor of this order, comes up for its five-yearly review in 2005. It should be interesting for India to watch this exercise, but much of what happens then would depend on the course the initiatives being put forth by the US now.

In fact, some of the measures suggested by Bush have a special relevance for India. The first relates to the Proliferation Security Initiative PSI, a concept first put forth by Bush in May 2003 in response to the missile shipment from North Korea to Yemen. Seeking better global cooperation to curb such transfers, the PSI includes France, Italy, Japan, Germany, Poland, Australia, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the UK and USA. It strives to interdict suspected transfer or transport of WMD through rapid exchange of relevant information, tracking suspect cargo, conducting joint military exercises, and so on. Bush has called for further expansion of PSI countries and emphasised the need to take direct action against proliferation networks. Given Pakistan8217;s proliferation, it would be of interest to India to join the PSI, if it is sincere about addressing the China-Pak-North Korea WMD nexus.

Second, Bush8217;s call to strengthen global controls holds significance. His exhortation to nuclear suppliers group NSG to refuse to sell enrichment and reprocessing equipment to any state that does not already possess such full-scale functioning plants could prove to be an opportunity for India since it has the full fuel cycle capability. Could this then be interpreted as a possibility that the NSG would lift its embargoes on India? Third, Bush has mandated that only states that have signed the Additional Protocol to the NPT be allowed to import equipment for civilian nuclear programs. This Protocol requires states to declare and provide more intrusive details, and allow IAEA snap inspections over a broad range of nuclear activities.

Interestingly, the US Senate itself is yet to ratify this Protocol, though America signed it in 1998. But can the Protocol be signed by India without acceding to the NPT? Would the P-5 allow India to sign the Protocol as a nuclear weapon state and thus make it eligible to import nuclear reactors, technology and material without having to accept full-scope safeguards? Can this be one way of India being allowed entry into the non-proliferation regime and being granted nuclear weapon status?

Certainly, three emerging realities have to be kept in mind. First, India is emerging as a fast growing economy. According to World Bank estimates, its rate of energy demand will grow at 5.3 per cent per annum in the first decade of the 21st century and at 10 per cent per annum by 2020. In order to meet this, expansion of the nuclear programme would be necessary. Hence, NSG imports for India8217;s power programme would be significant for India8217;s economy and ecology. Second, the foolishness in denying civilian nuclear technology to India is brought out when Bush himself concedes the loophole in the NPT that was exploited by North Korea and Iran by covertly using civilian programmes to produce weapons usable nuclear material.

In fact, while the non-proliferation regime failed to catch the real proliferators, it unfairly targeted genuine non-proliferators like India. As a way to plug the loophole, Bush has suggested that the world must create a safe system to field civilian nuclear plants without adding to the danger of proliferation by ensuring that only states that have renounced enrichment and reprocessing have reliable access at reasonable cost to fuel for civilian reactors. But it would be helpful if the NSG were to offer newer reactor technologies that are more efficient and proliferation resistant to nations that already have the enrichment and reprocessing technology in place and whose nuclear export policy too is above board and beyond question. Third, steps such as those put forth by Bush can only hold up the worn out non-proliferation order for some more time, until another crisis.

A long-term solution to enhance the durability of the fabric lies in correcting the structural flaws in the regime. Persisting with an order that discriminates may not help since the notion that nuclear weapons are fine in the hands of some but not others has sprung leaks often enough. Bush has promised to hear out friends and allies on all new measures. India, as a strategic ally of the US could play an engendering role in this process.