
Days before the reconciliation process begins on the Indo-US civil nuclear cooperation Bill, New Delhi has sought a clarification from Washington on the Bingaman Amendment that calls for establishing a cooperative threat reduction programme between the both countries.
Sources said the amendment8212;now a part of the Senate version of the Bill8212;was never brought up with India during the negotiations and to that extent, is not binding on India. However, the amendment has not escaped attention of N-deal critics who see this as an intrusive measure.
While New Delhi is a bit upset that there was no indication on any such move from Washington, it does not see it as a deal-breaker simply because this is not the first time the US Congress has sought to establish such a programme with India.
Four years ago, the Congress, through Section 8171 of the Department of Defence Appropriations Act 2002, tasked the Secretary of Defence to submit a report describing 8220;steps that have to be taken to develop cooperative threat reduction programmes with India and Pakistan8221;. This was how far the issue went as it was never taken up formally with India.
The Cooperative Threat Reduction Programme was framed to address the issue of nuclear weapons in breakaway republics of the erstwhile Soviet Union. The idea was to inspect, check and safeguard such warheads and radioactive material. The programme was to also look at dealing with scientists involved in such projects before the Soviet break-up. Since many were rendered unemployed, another objective was to ensure that they were not lured by terror groups.
The Bingaman Amendment, while urging the US Administration to establish such a programme, operates on the logic of pursuing 8220;common non-proliferation objectives8221; through cooperation among Indian and American scientists. This could also mean a range of joint research projects on proliferation resistant technologies like the Generation 4 reactors, which is mentioned in the July 18 joint statement. In fact, sources point out that the objective in 2002 could have been different.
Similar is the case with a host of reporting requirements tied to this Bill. Many of them are already necessitated by the Congress through Section 601 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act which requires the US President to submit a report on what the Administration has done to make countries with nuclear weapons give up the option and join the NPT.
While India has been a major target of the US non-proliferation regime, sources said, there is little mention of the Indian programme in these reports. Such an objective was also laid in the Foreign Assistance Act with India in 1992-93, but that did not come in the way of India going ahead with the Pokhran tests.
Having agreed to separate the civilian programme from the strategic, the understanding is that India must look to integrate with the norms of international civilian nuclear energy cooperation. The strategic side is not up for discussion and to that extent, both versions of the Bill in the US Congress have been broadly sensitive to this distinction which lies at the heart of the N-deal.