Lines to regain control

After General Pervez Musharraf stepped down as the army chief and ceded power to a civilian government, India had high hopes that the new democratic dispensation in Pakistan would quickly move to intensify the peace process, complete the negotiations on Kashmir, and begin the long overdue transformation of bilateral relations.

What New Delhi got, however, was a determined effort by the Pakistan army and the ISI to vitiate bilateral relations, coupled with the inability of the new civilian leaders to gain control over the India policy. New Delhi held its peace for a while; after the bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul last month, however, India had no choice but to go public with its concerns.

About 10 days ago, Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon declared that the peace process is now under 8220;stress8221;. Speaking after his talks with the visiting Pakistan foreign secretary, Salman Bashir, Menon pointed to a series of developments that has pushed the bilateral dialogue into a difficult phase. These developments, according to Menon, were frequent violations by the Pakistan army of the nearly five-year-old ceasefire, intensification of cross-border terrorism, and incitement to violence in Jammu and Kashmir.

Events since then, the terrorist attacks in Bangalore, Ahmedabad and Surat and fresh incidents on the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir have only reinforced India8217;s worst fears.

India, however, cannot return to the traditional framework of dealing with Pakistan. Ending the dialogue or merely responding in kind to the Pakistan army on the Line of Control will serve no purpose. New Delhi, instead, should focus on an asymmetric response that undercuts the political objectives of Pakistan8217;s current military leadership. Central to that strategy must be recognition that the recent disturbing trends in India-Pakistan relations are inextricably tied to the unfolding internal power struggle in Pakistan.

At first cut, the Pakistan army8217;s decision to renew military tensions with India on its eastern frontier makes little sense at a time when it is struggling to manage the western borders with Afghanistan. The new tensions on the Line of Control can only be seen as a diversionary tactic by the Pakistan army and the ISI to re-establish their primacy at home. New Delhi, then, must resist the temptation of following the script written for it by the Pakistan army and the ISI.

The most important policy proposition for India is to avoid seeing Pakistan as a coherent whole at this juncture. Even as the army and the ISI stepped up their provocations, Pakistan8217;s commerce ministry last month took a major step towards liberalisation of trade and investment with India. Nor can India dismiss as irrelevant the many positive sentiments on bilateral relations articulated by the civilian leaders of Pakistan such as Asif Ali Zardari and Nawaz Sharif, who lead the two main political parties, the PPP and the PML-N, respectively.

In coping with the current instability in Pakistan, India needs many new ways of thinking about its most important neighbour. For one, India can no longer rely on a single interlocutor in Pakistan. Nor can New Delhi limit itself to the customary binary choice of either full engagement or no engagement at all. India needs several simultaneous policies towards Pakistan.

Second, if the current threat to the peace process is rooted in Pakistan8217;s domestic power struggles, India must face up to the imperative of actively shaping the evolution of its internal politics. This in turn involves a direct outreach to the various actors there 8212; the political parties, provincial chief ministers, religious groups, and President Musharraf.

Third, India must begin to put public pressure on the Pakistan army to accept a direct engagement with the Indian armed forces. Until now, the Pakistan army has resisted contact at the higher level with its counterparts in India. If Army Chief Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani is serious about accepting the supremacy of the civilian rule at home, he should be prepared to engage the Indian military establishment.

India must offer to send its director general of military operations, the army chief, the defence secretary and the defence minister for direct talks with their counterparts in Pakistan to negotiate an enduring framework for peace and military tranquillity on the border.

Fourth, New Delhi8217;s actions in Afghanistan might make a more definitive impression on the Pakistan army than a tit-for-tat retaliation on the Line of Control or loud Indian protestations against the ISI. Prime Minister Singh8217;s conversations with the Afghan president, Hamid Karzai, in Colombo, then, might be more consequential for India-Pakistan relations than his talks with the Pakistani prime minister, Gilani.

The South Asian summit in Colombo offers Dr Singh an important opportunity to signal a clear message to Pakistan 8212; that India will do all it can to ease Pakistan8217;s current national security and economic crises. India can help itself and Pakistan by accelerating the negotiations on the Kashmir dispute, agreeing to significant force reductions on the border, signing a peace and friendship treaty, and a generous opening of the Indian market for Pakistani goods. The flip side of this message must be equally clear 8212; if the Pakistan army and the ISI choose a two-front war, India will certainly be up to the occasion.

The writer is a professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

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