Kargil, the final battle

There is no reason for any reasonably alert agency not to have picked up this activity. After all, this could not have been achieved in a few days time. Route guidance and reconnaissance for these infiltrators would have beendone through the locals of the area. No warning came from them also. Besides, satellite reconnaissance and electronics snooping also failed.

The Pakistani aim may be limited here 8212; to cut the road link between Srinagar and Leh to force India to take escalatory action, so as to bring Kashmir back on the centrestage from the backburner that the Lahore declaration had put it on. This has been a failure of anticipation and correct focussing on the sector on our part.

India has used its air force for the first time in Jammu and Kashmir in support of ground troops. This self-inflicted restriction on us has been lifted and one important component of the armed forces permitted to play the role it is meant to.

The air strikes are most essential at this stage, not alone for the battle that is raging at Kargil, but even more importantly for national pride. India is seen as a soft state by Pakistan. It has committed the most heinous crimes in the country, starting from the 1947 war in Kashmir to the two wars of1965 and 1971 thrust upon us, the insurgency in Punjab, Jamp;K, the bombings all over the country and the inciting of Hindu-Muslim riots. It is obsessed with the two nation-theory and, in spite of its final burial in Bangladesh, supports the insurgency in Kashmir as part of that mental makeup.

Airstrikes in Kargil strike at the root of that makeup. It is a message to Pakistan that India means business, and Pakistan should bring its army and ISI under political control. Militarily, what are the prospects of air power bringing the infiltration under control? It has not been launched with that purpose. It is a morale-booster in support of the ground troops. Airstrikes have certain facets that must be correctly understood; otherwise we would expect to see the kind of results that CNN and BBC show every day from Yugoslavia. Here they are different.

Since it is a very hostile terrain, it is not easy to get targets at those heights where a few men can hide behind boulders and folds in the mountains. There is littletime to pick up targets and there is no guidance from ground troops as there is no contact line. Bombs and rockets have low effect, as on steep slopes they tend to go over or remain short and land in the Valley.

Insurgents will move during the night and bad weather. Aircraft can stay in the area only up to mid-day, after which high winds, clouds and foul weather force them to base. They will leave a few lookouts on top while themselves going down the hillside and remaining hidden.

The Valley and Ladakh are not the best areas for an aerial war. We will not be able to apply our superior air power in this sector if it comes to a showdown. For such operations, the best equipment is armed helicopters and slow-moving ground support aircraft, like the USA-10 Warthog. Using fighter bombers of the MiG-23/27 variety is too expensive an exercise for fighting insurgents in terms of machines and highly trained pilots. It would meet with anti-aircraft fire, the shoulder-fired variety. The best target from the air isthe insurgents8217; logistics back-up.

The army must have seen this area as one through which infiltration was a possibility but not in large numbers and with the aim of capturing territory. The troops deployed in the area have basically guarded the LoC against a war-time action where attacks are likely through known routes. To a certain extent this is understood, as the army cannot guard against every contingency, as that would need a large number of troops.

The normal tactic is to shift troops on warning or on anticipation of action by thinning out in less active areas. The lack of warning from intelligence agencies made the army lose precious time in combating this menace. Perhaps the unorthodox tactics and the early movement of insurgents in terms of campaigning season have taken the local army commanders by surprise.

The last resort is ground action by the good old infantry soldier. He has been at it since 1947 in Jamp;K, then during 1962, 1965, including the capture of the indomitable Haji Pir Pass, theliberation of Bangladesh, Punjab and Jamp;K insurgency, the Siachen battle and the continuous exchange of fire on the LoC. He has also been responsible for counter-insurgency in the Northeast.

The final battle has begun. Pakistan has made a major move. It has to be defeated at its own game. The tasks are now clear-cut, though their execution will remain blurred till more data is available. First and foremost, further infiltration from across the border in this and other sectors has to be stopped.

Insurgents who have occupied some important heights have to be isolated from their bases and then eliminated. It will need a large number of troops. No time limit can be fixed. Also, Pakistan is likely to start insurgency in other sensitive areas. This has to be countered effectively.

Kashmir is our main battle. It is here that we uphold the integrity of India. Too long has India been seen as a soft state by a belligerent and irresponsible Pakistan. Its philosophy is, Ham to dubenge sanam, par tumhein bhi ledubenge8217; We will drown but we will drag you down too.We have fought insurgency through passive means till now. Insurgency has to be carried to Pakistan8217;s doorsteps. It will only be from a position of strength, of our economy and military power, that we will make Pakistan see the light of day. The political leadership must have the will to use this power.

The writer is a retired lieutenant general