Kargil inquiry in public perception

Meanwhile, the opposition parties became assertive and demanded an inquiry and a public debate aboutIndia being surprised by Pakistan on the Kargil Heights. There was a demand from various parties for a Rajya Sabha session. Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee presided over an all-party meeting where the government initially ag-reed to convene a Rajya Sabha session provided all parties agreed that it will be held in camera. Major opposition parties were not agreeable to hold an in-camera session. They wished the RS deliberations to be op-en to the public, arguing that in the absence of the Lok Sabha, the Upper House should be allowed to function as a catalyst to take Indian public into confidence. This was not acceptable to the government.

By the beginning of July, there were indications that Kargil will be an important issue in the elections. The government was accused of being afraid of a public debate. Informal demands and suggestions started floating around for a judicial inquiry, about the need to open a parliamentary inquiry committee, about the need to publish a comprehensive white paper on the conflict,about the need for a statutory inquiry commission and so on. There were statements, first that there was lack of information about Pakistani plans and activities on the LoC. Then there was the view circulating that information was available from the end of last year onwards, but it was not collated in an integrated manner. Then there were statements, including from our De-fence Minister, that there was no intellige-nce failure.

All this was compounded by references to higher-level political processes which neutra-lised or held in abeyance our intelligence assessment capacities. The th-eory put forward was that once the PM agreed to go to Lahore, the Na-waz Sharif-Vajpayee di-scussions will change the entire orientation of In-do-Pak relations on mo-re positive lines. So nobody can be blamed for not carefully assessing the intrusion. Various agencies of the government commenced exercises in self-defence aga-inst criticism about the intelligence failure and about the surprise that Pakistanis ma-naged togive.The prospects of all political parties demanding an inquiry during the election campaign became an important factor in the ruling coalition8217;s election campaign plans. It is in this context that the inquiry committee was nominated. In terms of general criteria and personal qualificati-ons, all the members are eminently qualified. K. Subramanyam, chairman, is one of India8217;s foremost defence and strategic affairs experts. Lt. General Hazari, who retired in 1986, is an individual of impeccable professional credentials. B.G. Ver-ghese8217;s credibility as an impartial, non-partisan journalist needs no emphasis. But the committee8217;s credibility and impartiality have been questioned by some segments of public opinion.

Despite the individual credentials of the members and its member secretary Satish Chandra, the fact remains that three out of four members of the committee 8212; Subramanyam, Verghese and Chandra 8212; are current members of the National Se-curity Advisory Board, a body nominated by the government, anentity which dealt with the Ka-rgil crisis and advised the government on its management. Moreover, Sa-tish Chandra heads the NSC Secretariat which is perceived as the repository of relevant intelligence information and as the agency which is responsible for integrated intelligence assessmen-ts. The committee, ther-efore, seems to be an entity consisting of persons connected with the government who may be inhibited in carrying out an impartial and in-depth investigation. Secondly, it is not a statutory body with authority to summon witnesses. Its detailed terms of reference have not been made pu-blic. Matters were made worse by George Fernandes stating on July 25 that the committee is not tasked to investigate issues related to intelligence failures. He, as usual, has denied that he said so on July 27.

Given the personal qualities and ba-ckground of the members of this comm-ittee, the criticism that they will do a wh-ite-wash job for the government is not likely to be correct. But changing publicperceptions about the membership of the committee and its lack of terms of reference and the Defence Minister hi-mself excluding the most important aspect of investigation from its jurisdiction, has resulted in a confusing situa- tion in which its role seems to be ill-defi-ned and uncertain and its credibility is becoming a matter of partisan political debate. One wonders why the committee could not be chaired by Field Ma-rshal Manekshaw, with Subramanyam, Verghese and one of the former chiefs of our IB or RAW as members.

It is also pertinent to mention an illustrative list of points to be investigated: a Was there a continuous flow of political assessments from our mission in Isla-mabad and from our concerned ministries and agencies about Pakistani attitudes and policies before the Lahore su- mmit? b Was there a flow of accurate information on the ground situation on the LoC and about Pakistani military and para-military moves towards the LoC? c Was an integrated assessment made in collating thesetwo categories of information, before the summit and more importantly, was there a continuous exercise in making such assessments in the weeks following the summit? d If such assessments were made, were they submitted for consideration with policy options to the concerned ministers and to the Co-uncil of Ministers? e Is there any truth in the allegations that the northern command of the Indian army reduced its fo-rces in the Kargil sector in the weeks preceding the Kargil conflict due to inacc- urate political and intelligence assessm-ents? And finally, what were the procedural and institutional shortcomings wh-ich resulted in our being surprised in Kargil? If we are serious about undertaking a purposeful investigation, there is no place for party politics, election manoeuvring or inhibitions in such an exercise.