
British foreign secretary Jack Straw has finally articulated what everyone has known for more than five decades: that the British colonial government erred grossly in making 8216;serious mistakes8217; by not upholding their own laws in the colonies, resulting in the festering wound that Kashmir has become. The transfer of power was to be based on the Indian Independence Act of 1947 of the British Parliament. The core of the transfer agenda was the partition of some of the provinces ruled directly by the British to create Pakistan, and the lapse of imperial 8216;paramountcy8217; over the nearly 600 princely states including J038;K, setting the rulers free of past treaties. In theory, each of these states would have the choice of becoming independent, although advised to accede to either India or Pakistan. It was under such transfer provisions that the state of J038;K acceded to India.
Less known, and even lesser understood, was the case of Gilgit-Hunza agencies of J038;K the northern territories in PoK. A young British army captain, an officer of the J038;K state forces posted in Gilgit, incited a part of the forces under his command to mutiny and led them to murder the non-Muslim officers and troops loyal to the state, before unilaterally declaring accession of the region to Pakistan! Under any military law, or even the British traditions, the man should have been tried for treason, mutiny and criminal conduct. But the British governor of North West Province of Pakistan accepted Captain Browne8217;s telegram seeking accession. Ironically, the Pakistan Supreme Court ruled in the mid-1990s that this region was part of the state of J038;K on August 15, 1947. More recent research indicates that one renegade minister with a Curzonian zeal working even in opposition to the decisions of the British cabinet pursued a policy at the UN to convert that accession into a 8216;dispute.8217;
A quarter century after the British were given a ceremonial send off at the Gateway of India in then Bombay, the ghost of British imperialism was finally laid to rest at the erstwhile imperial summer capital of India. The 1972 Simla Agreement firmly excluded all and any external role, and offered to Pakistan peace with justice and dignity, as was claimed by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto after signing the Simla Agreement. By committing themselves to solve the outstanding issues bilaterally, the two countries also signalled the end of imperial interference, which unfortunately has not entirely disappeared from the nostalgia of the Raj as indeed we saw when Jack Straw himself referred to J038;K as 8216;unfinished business8217; earlier this year. By putting the floodlight on past mistakes, that have cost tens of thousands of Indian lives, Straw has opened up an opportunity for seeking an honest answer to questions that need to be seriously and fairly debated.