Good intentions, bad doctrine

A classical point in case is the huge divergence that resulted in the conduct of New Delhi8217;s Pakistan policy. The Doctrine and the Establishment in New Delhi seemed to have different views about the manner and method of conducting this policy. Although the Doctrine never spoke of non-reciprocity with Pakistan, as distinguished from Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka and Maldives, the entire projection by Gujral and his close advisors for a softer and more accommodating line on Pakistan seemed to smell of non-reciprocity.

Several reasons could be ascribed to this feeling in sections of the intellectual elite that Gujral8217;s softness towards Pakistan was conditioned by his own personality. A refugee from Pakistan, he has achieved the highest elected political office in the country. Belonging to a generation that saw two distinct periods of history in the sub-continent, there was also a perception that Gujral8217;s Pakistan policy was determined by nostalgia and a misplaced hope. It was being perceived that the traditional policy towards Pakistan which has been governed by hard boiled realism was being given up. There was also an unnatural sense of urgency in trying to win bonds of friendship with Islamabad. This perhaps was once again conditioned by his own perception that with the passing away of a generation of politicians on either side of the Radcliffe Line, improvement in Indo-Pak relations by new elites would be difficult.

To the Establishment, this seemed to be the wrong reasons for engaging Pakistan. A bitter proxy war with Pakistan has been waged in Jammu and Kashmir over the past decade. An even longer eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation in Siachen has been continuing with neither side showing signs of relenting. The involvement of the ISI in terrorist activity in different parts of India and Pakistan8217;s hostile attitude towards India in international fora have been sources of constant irritation.

In the 17 months that Gujral was the chief architect of India8217;s foreign policy, his softness towards Pakistan was not appreciated in Pakistan and the media attempted to see a bigger and more sinister plot behind the image of a friendly leader from its principal adversary nation. Similarly, his repeated efforts to suggest that Islamabad was agreeable to economic cooperation with India were out of tune with ground realities. The purchase of surplus power from Pakistan is a case in point. Every time Gujral spoke of this possibility, Sharif or his ministers would shoot down the idea with some excuse. The difference between Sharif and Gujral has been that the former is ready to talk to India out of its present economic compulsions. With Gujral, friendship with Pakistan is an article of faith. Apart from not being able to move Sharif away from the hard-line policy of Kashmir before all else, Gujral was also unable to forge with Pakistan a unity of purpose in international fora. Both countries shied away from making common cause on the CTBT issue. On other international issues as well, Pakistan has continued to remain allergic to openly working with India.

Peace and rapprochement between traditional rivals can only be possible if one side is able to achieve a preponderance of power.