Estranged bedfellows

It is not the first time that the Sena supremo has thrown such tantrums. But in the past, the Sena was stronger and could easily assert itself with the BJP. This asymmetry in the BJP-Sena relationship was the hallmark of the alliance in the eighties. The BJP then didn8217;t even dare dream of coming to power. It had won only two seats in the 1984 Lok Sabha elections and its cadres were very demoralised. The Sena had the muscle power, and Thackeray was very emphatic in stating his whims. And though the Congress was in power, and probably never imagined it would be dislodged, the Sena used to rule the streets and govern the political mood. Though more pronounced in Mumbai, this aggressiveness had the rest of Maharashtra in awe of the Sena and its chief. The BJP drew its strength from Sena activists, who were either popular in their localities or could terrorise them.

The political equation began changing in 1990 when L.K. Advani emerged as a militant Hindu hero with his rath yatra. The demolition of the Babri Masjid created such hyper-euphoria in Maharashtra that the Sena realised its status, in relation to the BJP, now stood significantly altered. When the BJP leadership panicked and said it was sorry for the destruction of the masjid, Balasaheb Thackeray roared that his brave Sainiks had brought down the structure. But it was a futile effort at stealing some thunder, because everybody knew that the Sena hadn8217;t participated in either the rath yatra or the demolition.

A year before the 1995 assembly election in Maharashtra, BJP leader Gopinath Munde undertook a whirlwind tour across the state, campaigning against the Congress8217;s corruption and so-called policy of appeasement. That campaign set the stage for the victory of the saffron alliance in 1995. The stage was set, but the Sangh Parivar didn8217;t have a cadre street-smart enough to mingle with factory workers, slum dwellers and the mass of Marathi lumpens. That was the Sena8217;s forte. The BJP was essentially a middle class party with a base among the urban upper castes and classes, while the Sena had roots among the plebians.

Thus a unique alliance was formed which brought together the traditional 8220;class enemies8221;. The upper-caste-upper-class Mumbaikars were contemptuous of the slums and the blue collar proletariat. But ideologically they were saffronised, and for the sake of power they had to come to terms with the mass represented by the Shiv Sena. Balasaheb understood this petty bourgeois weakness and exploited it to the hilt. The Sena demanded and got close to two-thirds of the seats, and the remaining were left for the BJP to fight. This caused a lot of heartburn among the BJP cadres, but Balasaheb8217;s image was so overbearing that they could do nothing.

Neither in style nor in culture was there anything in common between the two parties. But they had to live together like un-identical twins. The relationship, instead of strengthening, actually soured after the alliance came to power. Both parties wanted to expand their political space. There was competition and, of course, conflict as the largesse was distributed. This conflict spilled into other areas because the alliance couldn8217;t satisfy the aggrandising ambitions of their karyakartas and netas. The alliance developed cracks when it was in power.

When the Shiv Sena-BJP failed to return to power in 1999, the blame game began. The BJP accused the Sena cadres of not working for the Sangh Parivar and the Sena leadership complained that the BJP leaders were framing the Sainiks as uncouth and characterless. The alliance could not improve its image, notwithstanding the fact that the Congress and the NCP had lost credibility. Five years later, there was a grand possibility of coming back to power, riding on the wave of disillusionment with the Congress front. But internecine conflicts within the alliance surfaced and they lost an excellent opportunity in 2004.

In the last two years, Narayan Rane and later Raj Thackeray left the Shiv Sena, weakening it further. Moreover, in the 2004 elections, the BJP won half the seats it contested, while the Sena could win just about one-third of its quota. The BJP was also getting tired of the Sena8217;s arrogance and hyperbole. Many in the BJP, including the late Pramod Mahajan, were strategising to go it alone. But the party had started losing its middle class base too. Both parties in the alliance had become vulnerable.

If the Sena and BJP go it alone, there is the distinct possibility of both plunging into oblivion. If they choose to stay together, as they seem to have decided to do for now, they must tolerate each other. It is a dilemma that can be resolved only by blowing hot and cold, while sharing a bed that is too narrow for two.