Drawing the line

One of the suggestions to minimise tensions between India and Pakistan has been that of converting the LoC into an international border. Thi...

One of the suggestions to minimise tensions between India and Pakistan has been that of converting the LoC into an international border. This idea needs to be analysed from India8217;s perspective. The LoC has been demarcated by military officials, delineated on maps and recognised by both parties. This is why advocates of conversion suggest making the de facto line into the actual border. Since neither nation can gain absolute victory it is better to divide Kashmir between India and Pakistan, they say.

Four issues raise their head at this juncture. First, the acceptability of the idea 8212; to India, Pakistan and, importantly, to the Kashmiris. Indian leaders have repeatedly said the conversion of LoC into an international border is not acceptable. In 1994, a resolution was passed in Parliament stating that the whole of J038;K is an integral part of India. Both the political and military leadership in Pakistan is also against the idea. Kashmiris on both sides have been against any permanent division of the state along the LoC. Given this reality, just who are we selling this idea to?

The second issue pertains to Pakistan8217;s role in furthering cross-border terrorism. Will such a conversion restrain Pakistan from indulging in such activities? Is Pakistan8217;s aim in Kashmir merely to annex a part or the whole of Kashmir? Since 1989, Pakistan has been using Kashmir as a means to bleed India and it is doubtful whether it will abstain from this strategy in the future. Therefore, even if Pakistan agrees to the conversion, which it is unlikely to do, there is no guarantee that that would stop cross-border terrorism. In that case, conversion would not resolve anything for India.

The third issue pertains to the terrorists who have been fighting in J038;K. The conversion is not acceptable to them and they demand either independence or Kashmir8217;s merger to Pakistan. It has been amply proved in the recent past that General Musharraf8217;s control over these groups is limited. Some of them, like the Lashkar-e-Toiba which is financially independent of the ISI, have pan-Islamic objectives. For them Kashmir is only a means to achieve their broader goals. Pakistan is also aware that once the problem is solved, against the wishes of these groups, they would wreck havoc inside Pakistan.

The fourth issue pertains to the LoC itself. The agreement by both nations at Simla in 1972 matches, to a great extent, the Cease-fire Line CFL that was agreed in January 1949, after the first war between both nations on Kashmir. But the LoC is demarcated only up to NJ 9842 and beyond that 8212; where the Siachen glacier falls 8212; there is a dispute over the boundary. Both the countries consider Siachen strategically important and efforts to resolve the issue for the past 18 years have proved futile.

Given these factors, India has very less to gain by converting the LoC into an international border.

The writer is research officer, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies