Between identity and power

It refurbishes the party8217;s commitment to the politics and culture of coalition and decisively demonstrates the indispensability of Vajpayee to lead the alliance. But it has, nonetheless, clearly exposed the BJP8217;s continuing but formidable dilemma of choosing between identity and power.

The ideological retreat of the BJP, despite being palpably pragmatic in the backdrop of coalitional and electoral politics, has the potential to undermine its identity and ideology. Besides, it will also earn for theparty the wrath and resentment of its long nurtured constituency which emotionally identifies with the party8217;s core concerns.

The BJP8217;s 1998 electoral performance, its all-time best, was a telling testimony to the assertion of its ideological identity, solely inherited from the RSS, as also the party8217;s pre-poll strategic seat adjustments with several state-level parties. But the BJP also found it could not secure the support of its pre-poll and post-poll allies to form a credible coalition, with the sole exception of its alter-ego, the Shiv Sena, unless it agrees to put its core concerns8217; on the back burner.

There is then this strange, if not pathetic, spectacle of a party giving up its life-sustaining slogans and formulations with masterly ease in order to grab power. The very birth of the BJP-led 1998 coalition was thus rooted in an unprecedented and, partly if not wholly, lustful, self-betrayal. The subsequent tirade-like intervention by the votaries of the Hindu agenda8217;, spearheaded by the VishwaHindu Paris-had, was a desperate attempt to neutralise the consequences of the dilution of the BJP8217;s Hindu identity8217;.

There is this paradox gripping the BJP then: it cannot win seats in substantial number unless it unambiguously highlights its core concerns8217; at the time of the election, but it cannot form the government unless it completely gives up the same.

In the 1998 elections, the BJP did not enter into a full-fledged pre-poll alliance with its allies. It was only a case of mutually beneficial seat adjustments that were arrived at. In the forthcoming elections, however, seat adjustments alone would not have been enough. The BJP and its allies needed to demonstrate a 8220;unity of minds8221;, not merely seat adjustments, in order to carry conviction with the people. And this 8220;unity of minds8221; is impossible unless the BJP consciously shelves its core issues at the time of elections.

This sends the message of ideological diffidence, bordering on timidity, and a cynical preference for power at any cost.If the BJP had not given up its core ideological issues which had saved it from an acute and debilitating identity crisis in the wake of its traumatic defeat in the 1984 elections and had led to its massive expansion, it would have created a piquant situation for its allies.

It should be noted that apart from the uneasy relationship with the AIADMK general secretary, the major period of the BJP-led coalition was characterised by a candid clash between the Vajpayee camp and the RSS-sponsored VHP-Bajrang Dal combine. Not withstanding the Vajpayee-RSS truce, shortly before the fall of the BJP-led government, which gave the government a modicum of stability, the aggressive articulation of the Hindu agenda8217; as a counter statement to the national agenda8217; of the coalition, had underscored the acute resentment of the RSS-VHP combine. The em- ergence of coalition politics in India, more than anything else, has paved the way for marginalising the Hindu agenda8217;.

The RSS-Vajpayee truce indicates that the BJP isnot really a sovereign8217; party in the real democratic sense of the term. For its origin, ideological inspiration, evolution and leadership, it was and is almost totally dependent on the RSS. These ties with the RSS have given it a powerful organisational structure and elan. But this nearly unbreakable RSS-connection has proved to be an outright liability for a BJP presiding over a coalition.

The VHP, for example, attributed attacks on the Christians, including the widespread damage to their property housing prayer homes, churches, school buildings in different parts of the country, particularly in Gujarat, to the forcible conversions8217; of Hindus by the Christian missionaries. This was, at best, a crude attempt to rationalise, if not justify, the assaults on the Christian community. The Prime Minister, succumbing to the RSS-VHP pressure himself, lent credibility to this exercise by calling for a national debate on conversions.

The very structure of the RSS-headed Sangh Parivar8217;, and the BJP8217;s officiallyunstated but nonetheless prominent position within it, therefore poses a serious methodological challenge to those who seek to study the BJP. There is no other political party in India, or elsewhere in the democratic world, which is formally or informally related to any other formation outside its organisational boundary in the manner the BJP is related to the RSS and the Sangh Parivar. The BJP, therefore, still lacks complete control over its ideology, it is not the sole author of its policy and architect of its organisational structure.

The abject inability of the Congress and the non-Congress parties and groups who voted against the confidence motion in the Lok Sabha to produce either a viable minority government or a credible coalition has enhanced the electoral prospects of the National Democratic Alliance, in addition to the generation of a wave of sympathy for Vajpayee himself.

If the National Democratic Alliance is successful in capturing power, it may, hopefully, be the beginning of the forcefuldelinking of the BJP and the RSS. Conversely, if the alliance fails to capture power, it will not only give a serious blow to the Vajpayee-led moderate and liberal sections of the Sangh Parivar, but also lead to a massive, remorseless and retaliatory resurrection of Hindu Agenda8217; by the BJP. The historic dilemma of the BJP to choose between identity and power will, therefore, continue to haunt it whether it is in government or in opposition.

The writer is reader, political science, in Delhi University