A war not so faraway

Any impact of the war on India and its interests would largely depend upon how the war may start, how it evolves, and how it would end. The adverse political consequences may be less negative if the war gets mandated by the UN and thus gets a degree of legitimacy. UN inspectors are scheduled to present a fuller report at the end of January and this would indicate the trend for the future. If publicly available information so far is any indication, it appears that, while there may be evidence of chemical and biological weapon related activity, and a handful of SCUD-type short-range ballistic missiles may be unaccounted, little, if anything, is likely to support the charge that Iraq has, or is currently building, nuclear weapons. Iraq is co-operating in the inspections and has promised to provide clarifications where required. Depending upon the actual evidence found by the inspectors, the UN Security Council would have to pay attention to the question of proportionality before it can authorise the use of force.

But more importantly, the US and UN would have to seriously address the issue of the political goals that should define the nature of military operations. As long as disarmament remains the central goal, the war may still be avoidable. But if the aim is 8216;regime change8217;, then a number of probable consequences start to emerge. Either way, in case of a full-scale war, the conflict could stretch into months and become increasingly murky, in spite of Iraq8217;s heavily degraded military capability and the US superiority in high-technology weaponry. Saddam Hussein would opt to fight in Baghdad, and urban fighting is notoriously destructive. On the other hand, a sharp, surgical operation to eliminate Saddam Hussein could possibly produce minimum fall-out. In the worse case, if Saddam Hussein resorts to the use of chemical weapons, the US would have a difficult choice 8212; to respond in kind, or use nuclear weapons as stipulated in its official strategy? Casualties could then touch as high as 4 million from the lowest estimates of around 250,000 in a conventional war, mostly Iraqi civilians.

But that does not resolve the question of the post-Saddam Hussein scenario. The opposition in Iraq has not shown any signs of cohesion or ability to provide a viable credible successor regime. Given Iraq8217;s past history, the risk of another dictator emerging would remain high. But this itself is likely to be accompanied by a fratricidal civil war which could stretch into months if not years.

The third possibility perhaps before the end of January is the eruption of a civil war, which may or not be engineered by external agencies, and which could sweep across the country. This might tempt the US to go in even unilaterally in the name of humanitarian intervention, strengthening the political logic of regime change. But the impact on the suffering people of Iraq would multiply rapidly and the responses of immediate neighbours to the possible redrawing of boundaries currently enforced as 8216;no fly zones8217; would become even more unpredictable. Iran or Turkey, for example, would have serious reservations about the emergence of a Kurdish homeland; and Saudis would have to worry about their Shia population in the oil-rich regions in the eastern sector. Iraq8217;s economy would collapse and existing institutions, however unpalatable to neighbours and unacceptable to the West, would dissolve in violence and bitterness.

A dramatic success for the US may strengthen the unipolar image; but any dragged out war would erode its influence, nudging the world toward greater multipolarity. Either way, it would serve our interests to take a principled stand for UN legitimacy. But the greatest impact on our interests would result from the likely instability of Iraq after a war and regime change brought about by external force. Regime change in Afghanistan was easier, but building post-Taliban Afghanistan has proved far more intractable. And Iraq is not Afghanistan. What is even more serious, Iraq8217;s instability could start to spin outward into uncontrollable consequences. Iraq8217;s neighbours, deeply unhappy with Saddam Hussein, would have to worry more about the post-Saddam instability than a contained and constrained Iraq.

At the minimum, the risk of radicalisation of Muslim society in and outside Iraq could pose un-anticipated challenges, especially to countries like ours which rely on plurality and moderation for stability. Anti-Americanism would only grow, especially if Washington still decides to pursue a more unilateralist strategy than it has been arguing for. This would pose difficulties for countries seeking closer relations with Washington. The contradictions of a war against a Muslim country accused of building nuclear weapons, a nuclear-armed Israel harshly aggressive against the Palestinians, and above all, velvet-diplomacy against nuclear renegade North Korea clearly claiming possession of nuclear weapons and delivery systems breaking all existing international commitments, is bound to deepen Muslim resentment across the world, of the West, led by the US, targeting Muslims. Jihadi terrorism would get a major boost worldwide, especially since al Qaeda is already regrouping. This cannot leave our country untouched, especially after Gujarat.