A sea of difference

Any naval officer would8217;ve selected Barak over Trishul, and the CBI is in dangerous waters on this score. Overruling the DRDO has often been in the best interests of the country

In the mid-90s an Indian naval specialist went to witness a Barak firing in the Mediterranean, conducted by the Israeli Navy. The target was Israel8217;s own Gabriel surface-to-surface missile, a sea-skimmer, that had won for Israel, the world8217;s first purely missile-to-missile encounter with the Egyptians in the Battle of Latakia. Our naval specialist was curious that only one Barak missile was being taken. 8216;What if there is a technical malfunction, or what if its not a clean hit? Don8217;t you realise what8217;s riding on the success of this shoot?8217; The Israeli specialist replied in a Hebrew version of 8216;Ek goli, Ek dushman8217;One bullet, one enemy. The Gabriel, flying 6 metres above the sea, was due to be destroyed at 6 kms and was duly shot down at 5.996 kms. The Indian navy had never before seen a genuine sea-skimming missile, going full pelt six metres above the waves shot down by any system, and nor has it seen a similar feat since by any other system.

The Israelis must have been sent by divine providence to save the Indian defence budget in the early nineties. Equipment being quoted for Rs. 20 crores by a European cartel and for Rs. 18 crores by the DRDO was being offered by the Israelis for Rs. 11 crores, and their stuff was world class. The Americans of course never tendered. Suddenly India had access to weapons that had defeated the enemy in battle and world class.

One of the areas where Israel possibly saved us was in relieving the anxiety of the Indian navy about the safety of its ships against the large number of sea skimming missiles Pakistan had acquired from the US and France. All countries have a maritime strategy, except for Pakistan. Its navy, marginalised by the army, has decided that future wars with India will be like a tennis match. Forget about strategy, just get a couple of Indian ships, so the score doesn8217;t look bad, like say 6-2 or 6-3. In this nihilistic environment the Indian navy tried many options, mostly from Russia. Some systems were impressive, others impressively noisy, but none other than the Barak could shoot down a sea-skimming missile.

Originally cleared for the Viraat, the navy soon realised what a good thing the Barak was and opted for six more systems. This occurred at about the time that things hotted up in the Arabian sea, firstly as a result of Kargil and then with operation Parakram. In both instances the navy deployed fully on the west coast and the urgency was felt to acquire the additional missile defence systems. At this stage or slightly earlier, enter the DRDO 8211; for comic relief. The DRDO has an enviable record of having delayed defence acquisitions, because some minister was convinced in the eighties that before a service imported a system, the DRDO could veto it, if it could make it locally. Sounds fine, but having said that it could make the piece of ordnance, it would generally deliver it years later, or not at all, when so much money had been committed.

The Indian system was supposed to match the Barak 8211; the Trishul has so far been not just a failure but an embarrassment. Overruling the Trishul in favour of the Barak is something any naval officer would have done, and the CBI is in dangerous waters on this score. Malfeasance may exist in the deal and only the investigative agency will know the hard facts, but overruling the DRDO has often been in the best interests of the country, and definitely no crime. Nor is overruling the defence secretary such a bad thing: he8217;d know as much about a missile system as the navy chief about stem cells.

The country faces two issues with the Barak deal. Was it a good system, and secondly were commissions paid? When the two are confused, the country ends up losing on all counts. In 1984 India had the best submarine hull building system in the world, imported from Germany. In 1987, allegations of kick-backs and corruption killed what was until then the biggest technology transfer to India by HDW. Twenty years later, when we wanted to build submarines to replace the Russian kilos, we were out with a begging bowl again, before the French, who now had no competitors. HDW of Germany had been black listed and we had shot ourselves in the foot again.

It is true there are dissensions in the navy about building the next generation Barak. These are professional differences and healthy for the system. One group would like a longer-range missile combined with a Gatling gun for point defence. The other feels that no last ditch system will ever work as well as the Barak II. The system will work out the solution eventually, but how do we insulate the country8217;s defence preparedness from investigations of corruption? Defence preparedness was sacrificed in submarine construction, in the Bofors deal and in all the emergency purchases resorted to, to meet the Kargil incursion. Can we hope that this time we will get it right and not shoot ourselves in the foot again? Catch the crooks by all means but let not the enemy benefit overall.

The writer is a retired rear admiral