What is Delhi Government’s Feed Back Unit (FBU), under scrutiny for ‘political espionage’?

The allegations against Sisodia also pertain to the diversion of government funds allocated to this unit under the ‘Secret Service Fund’ which financed the unit alleged to have carried out illegal surveillance on the Aam Aadmi Party’s political opponents, bureaucrats and members of the judiciary, among others.

What is the Feed Back Unit; is it still operational?

Setup in September 2015 with approval from the Delhi Cabinet of Ministers, the ‘Feed Back Unit’ was tasked with gathering ‘relevant information and actionable feedback’ regarding the working of government departments, autonomous bodies, institutions and entities under the jurisdiction of the Delhi government. Its mandate also included conducting sting operations, or ‘trap cases’, by its personnel, dubbed intelligence ‘assets’, on ‘targets’ or subjects – mainly individuals – under the Secretary of the Vigilance department but the ‘direct control of the Chief Minister’s Office.’

In a note to the Delhi Chief Secretary, Lieutenant Governor Vinai Kumar Saxena termed it “an extra-constitutional/extra-judicial body” on lines of a private intelligence agency, answering to none but a single individual. The LG said it was an “extraneous and parallel covert agency” with overarching powers of ‘snooping and trespass’ without any legislative, judicial or executive oversight whatsoever.

The unit became functional and began incurring expenditure for ‘operations’ in February 2016. A provision of Rs 1 crore was set aside for ‘Secret Service Expenditure’ for the unit in the Delhi government’s budget for the Financial Year 2016-17. There is no clarity on whether the unit is still functional.

What was the organizational setup of the FBU?

Under the charge of the Secretary of the Delhi government’s vigilance department, the FBU is supposed to have been under the ‘direct control of the Chief Minister’s Office, through individuals appointed as advisors to the Chief Minister. It is understood to have become operational with 17 contractual employees, most of whom were retired officials from the Intelligence Bureau, Central Paramilitary Forces and police organisations. The posts being created for the unit were initially proposed to be manned by serving as well as retired personnel.

Initially, 20 posts under the FBU were to be adjusted against 22 abolished posts of the Delhi government’s Industries Department but 20 of these posts in the FBU were adjusted against 88 posts created in the Anti-Corruption Branch allegedly without the consent of the Lieutenant Governor’s Secretariat. The unit also had a 6-vehicle contingent under it, including SUVs and 3 motorcycles along with supporting staff in the form of 4 Data Entry Operators.

What were the finances of the FBU like?

In the Delhi government’s annual budget for the Financial Year 2016-17, a provision of Rs.1 crore was kept for ‘Secret Service Expenditure’; it was proposed by the Deputy Director (Feedback) to provide Rs 25 lakhs as ‘Secret Fund’ to the FBU during the 2016-17 financial year. Out of the budget, Rs 10 lakh was found to have been released in two tranches of Rs 5 lakh each to the unit totalling Rs 10 lakh of which Rs 5.5 lakh was reported to have been spent.

On the other hand, remuneration to those manning the FBU was found to have been paid on the basis of an ‘attendance sheet’ and its staff members had recorded ‘100%’ attendance after it came into existence. Since February 2016, a total amount of over Rs 40.82 lakh is said to have been released to the FBU by way of ‘Secret Service Expenditure’, remuneration, telephone, and other miscellaneous expenses. These expenses were among the reasons for the vigilance departments’ recommendation to the LG to shut the unit down ‘immediately to avoid further infructuous/questionable expenditure.’

The CBI’s preliminary enquiry found vouchers supporting expenditure of Rs 2.10 lakh for engaging an allegedly non-existent private detective agency, in addition to 18 others amounting to over Rs 3.47 lakh that were spent as “source” money.

What is the Secret Service Fund?

A ‘Secret Service Fund’ was kept in a chest that could only be opened by turning two keys simultaneously, and bankrolled cash payments for “secret operations” made to “sources” for these. An ‘S’ followed by a number denoting the FBU operative to whom this amount had been paid was scrawled on an unofficial register against the date of payment as a record of each payment.

Disbursals from this fund meant for “different types of operations and collecting feedback” were supposed to be made only after the approval of ‘an advisor’ attached to Chief Minister Arvind Kejriwal’s office in addition to requiring the concurrence of a Deputy Director in charge of finance and administration of the FBU. Red flags related to the financial functioning of the body had been raised by officials manning it more than once.

What work did the FBU undertake?

The FBU, according to the CBI, undertook an investigation related to “confidential matters concerned with the working of Govt. of NCT of Delhi, different Ministries and departments” the reports of which went “directly to Hon’ble Chief Minister.”

The CBI’s analysis of the reports generated by the FBU, according to Saxena, suggested “a very disturbing scenario” in which political intelligence and issues unrelated to Vigilance accounted for around 40 per cent of these. These reports, according to the LG, were products of “clandestine infrastructure for snooping, apparently over political adversaries” and were “directly submitted to the Chief Minister” for serving “the vested interest of a particular political party.”

What are the charges against the FBU?

It is alleged that the FBU was a “covert body aimed at targeted espionage” meant to “camouflage clandestine political objectives” and operate without “any administrative control or oversight”. The FBU is said to have refused the Secretary (Vigilance), who was the administrative head of the FBU, copies of the reports generated by it exhibiting “blatant disregard of laid down procedures” and the general opacity in its workings.

It was, according to the LG’s observations, aimed at “surreptitiously creating an infrastructure for snooping/eavesdropping” in the capital, running, in effect, “a parallel system of illegitimate intelligence gathering infrastructure” for gathering political information on adversaries of the party in power and “countering the legitimately established Security/ Intelligence infrastructure of the Country” thus becoming “a potent tool for dangerous misuse”.