When Osama bin Ladins warriors brought down the twin towers in New York a decade ago,I found my self in Urumqi,the capital of Chinas far western province,Xinjiang. While Xinjiang,with its Muslim Uighur separatists,has become a lot more restive since then,Chinas profile in our north-western neighbourhood has begun to rise since 9/11.
On the morning of September 11,2001,a fellow journalist from Delhi Anand Sahay and I had finished interviewing a Chinese vice foreign minister in Beijing and boarded the flight to Urumqi.
After meeting local officials over dinner and touring the city,we straggled back to the hotel. After I finished my column for The Hindu by late night,I turned on the television,which had no international English channelsBBC and CNN.
On the other channels I saw visuals of the attacks on the twin towerswhich I thought was a probably a bad movie being shown on local channels. With the visuals being repeated again and again I rushed to the only computer with an internet connection that was weak and slow.
Following which I had sit up the whole night writing a fresh column on the implications of 9/11.
As the consequences of 9/11 continue to unfold a decade later,one significant outcome stands out–a more prominent role for China in deciding the future of the north-western subcontinent.
Once the initial shock of 9/11 passed,Beijing had two contradictory concerns. On the one hand,Beijing was relieved by Washingtons new focus on the war on terror. Recall that George W. Bush had come to power in January 2009 determined to confront the challenges from a rising China.
The aftermath of 9/11,which saw the US sucked deep into Afghanistan and Iraq,gave China much needed time and space to strengthen itself.
As China rose and the US steadily weakened, Beijings moment to lead the world is at hand.
On the other hand,military presence in Afghanistan,its new influence in Pakistan,and an ambitious agenda for democracy promotion in Central Asia deeply worried Beijing. China which lived with American military presence across its eastern shores had no desire to see the U.S. gain a strategic foot-hold on its South-western land borders.
A decade later,as the United States prepares to end its combat role in Afghanistan,China is well set to establish itself as a credible power on the Hindu Kush.
While the terror training grounds in the borderlands of Afghanistan and Pakistan do trouble Beijing in Xinjiang,it can always command,unlike Washington,can command the support of the Pak army and the ISI to go after anti-China terror groups.
The Pak Army sees Washington as an unreliable ally and has profound problems with American objectives in Afghanistan. In contrast,Rawalpindi believes Beijing is a more credible long-term partner,which help Rawalpindi achieve its goal of strategic depth in Afghanistan.
The last time the Pak army had decisive influence in Afghanistan,when he Taliban ruled from 1997 to 2001it did not have the economic resources to consolidate it. This time though with Chinese financial clout and the capacity to implement mega projects on short order,Rawalpindi could develop sustainable leverage in Afghanistan.
If the last decade was about the contradictions in the US-Pak
alliance after 9/11,the next ten years could well be about the impact of Sino-Pak partnership on Afghanistan.