Opinion Trump’s tariffs on India reveal America’s double standards
The real lesson here isn't about oil. It's about resilience. In the current geopolitical climate, where alliances are fluid and strategic alignments unpredictable, overreliance on any single partner, even the US, is risky
President Donald Trump speaks at the Oval Office on Wednesday. (Photo: AP) On August 6, about a week after issuing a sweeping 25 per cent tariff on all Indian imports, US President Donald Trump announced a 25 per cent additional tariff on India over its imports of Russian oil. The new measure raises tariffs on some Indian goods to as high as 50 per cent.
This is a wake-up call. This wasn’t just a trade policy decision. What started as strong bilateral cooperation has now become a strategic risk point. The US has been one of India’s most important defence partners recently, providing equipment and technology transfers. However, this relationship has also led to asymmetries. In times of diplomatic strain, these asymmetries turn into leverage. In a single stroke, the US has demonstrated its willingness to apply pressure on India for geopolitical ends. The tools may be economic, but the target is strategic.
This sets a dangerous precedent. In an era of great-power competition, India must keep the ability to make decisions in its national interest without fearing retaliation. Other than economic consequences, the tariffs also hold symbolic significance. They indicate a change in US expectations and a more assertive stance toward India’s foreign policy independence.
Trump and the US double standards
India’s increasing trade with Russia is being criticised, yet Western powers maintain stronger economic ties with Moscow. In 2024, India’s trade with Russia rose to $68.7 billion, mainly due to energy imports such as crude oil, coal, and fertilisers. That’s a tenfold rise compared to 2021 levels. Meanwhile, the EU maintained approximately $78 billion in total trade with Russia during the same period, with about $25 billion spent on fossil fuels alone.
Despite sanctions and vocal opposition to Moscow’s actions, Europe remains one of Russia’s largest trading partners. The United States, while engaging in much less trade, still imported around $5.2 billion in goods and services from Russia in 2024, primarily industrial inputs. Even in the first half of 2025, US imports from Russia totalled approximately $2.5 billion.
The contrast is clear: India, while pressured to reduce its ties with Russia, is not operating in isolation. The extent of US and EU trade with Moscow underscores a geopolitical double standard. India faces penalties for engaging in trade that others continue to pursue secretly. This context is crucial when evaluating India’s strategic choices. What one country sees as a national security concern, another may view as an economic necessity.
An independent defence posture
India’s ongoing partnership with Russia, especially in energy and defence, has become a point of controversy. But the real lesson here isn’t about oil. It’s about resilience. In the current geopolitical climate, where alliances are fluid and strategic alignments unpredictable, overreliance on any single partner, even the United States, is risky.
Strategic autonomy offers a path to a more secure future, demanding diversified dependencies, redundant supply lines, and domestic capacity. After all, India’s armed forces operate in a complex threat environment with active, contested borders with both China and Pakistan. A sudden disruption in critical defence supply chains could have immediate, even disastrous, consequences. Here are five steps to prevent that from happening:
Accelerate indigenous engine development: India must expedite engine R&D programmes. From the High Thrust Fuel Efficient Engine series to combat jet power plants, local capability should become a top-priority national goal. This effort should involve public sector R&D, private companies, and international co-development on India’s terms.
Diversify strategic partners: India must strengthen ties with other like-minded democracies, such as France, Japan, Israel, and South Korea, to foster systems, tech, and joint ventures. Diversifying strategic partners not only guards against supply shocks but also encourages technological innovation and knowledge exchange. Relying on multiple sources reduces the risk of any single country weaponising dependency, thereby boosting India’s strategic autonomy.
Secure critical subsystems locally: From radar modules to guidance chips and propulsion control units, India must develop and produce critical subsystems domestically. Even imported platforms should be gradually “de-Americanised” wherever feasible through local or alternative integration.
Invest big in defence innovation: India’s defence R&D spending remains low compared to global standards. A significant increase is needed not only for DRDO but also for startup ecosystems, university labs, and private manufacturing. Flexible funding, efficient trials, and transparent procurement processes are crucial.
Implement import substitution at scale: India’s negative import list and domestic procurement categories must be enforced strictly. By 2026, India should aim to produce 80-90 per cent of core military systems and subsystems domestically or through balanced joint ventures.
If India does not act decisively, the next round of tariffs or sanctions could have immediate operational effects. Delays in sourcing, halted upgrades, or frozen systems might impair India’s capacity to respond to crises, military or otherwise. Beyond economics or diplomacy, this concerns warfighting capability, sovereign decision-making, and the ability to defend national interests without foreign interference.
The situation also raises broader questions: What is the actual cost of sovereignty? How should a rising power shield its security system from geopolitical unpredictability? And how can India future-proof its defence industry without sacrificing capability? This moment demands more than tactical fixes. It requires a clear national doctrine: no vital system should be entirely dependent on an external power.
The writer is a lieutenant colonel, former Armoured Corps officer, defence analyst and strategic thinker