Opinion Toppling Assad takes a minority
Alawites,who constitute just 12 per cent of Syrias population,have mostly thrown their support behind Assad,fearful that if he is overthrown they will be massacred.
After four months of popular demonstrations and ferocious repression,including a bloody crackdown on the city of Hama on Sunday,the Syrian president,Bashar al-Assad,still refuses to step down,insisting that he can reform his regime. What is keeping Assad in power is the extensive security apparatus that was engineered by his father,Hafez al-Assad,and is dominated by their fellow Alawites,a minority Shia sect.
Alawites,who constitute just 12 per cent of Syrias population,have mostly thrown their support behind Assad,fearful that if he is overthrown they will be massacred. If the democratic opposition in Syria is going to succeed,it must first convince the Alawites that they can safely turn against the Assad regime. This is not that improbable. As the bodies have piled up around 1,500 civilians have been killed since March Alawite leaders have not been blind to the rapid erosion of the governments power. If assured of their safety,key Alawite leaders might begin to withdraw support. A signal from them could persuade powerful Alawite army commanders to defect.
Alawites have dominated Syria since Hafez al-Assad came to power in 1970. But unlike his father,Bashar has never been able to bring the countrys security apparatus fully under his control since taking power in 2000. Instead,he has tried to cultivate a gentle and humane image and broaden the base of the regime by reaching out to the Sunnis,who make up most of Syrias population. He married a wealthy Sunni woman whose family is from Homs a stronghold of the current revolt and actively encouraged the building of Sunni mosques and Koran schools.
But he hasnt altered the total domination of Syrias security forces by his Alawite clan. In the last decade,Bashar left his brother Maher al-Assad to organise the security sector with the support of his uncle and cousins,who control the ubiquitous secret police.
Since mid-March,as suppression of the protests became increasingly violent,the army has purged officers and soldiers including many hitherto loyal Sunni troops to reduce the chance of a revolt. The infamous Fourth Division,led by Maher and composed mostly of die-hard Alawite loyalists,played a major role in the crackdown. Even when a Sunni general is in command,an Alawite deputy often holds the real power. As a result of this structure,the army cannot be relied upon to carry out violent repression,nor is it able to defect as a whole.
Driven by fear of execution,disaffected soldiers have quietly worked to undermine the regime. Opposition leaders report that sympathetic soldiers and officers have sometimes warned them of imminent attacks. However,the armys top leadership is unlikely to collectively withdraw its support from the government,as happened in Egypt and Tunisia.
It is the Alawite population as a whole,not the army,that holds the key to change. But the Alawites will need assurances from the opposition before they abandon Assad. The onus falls on the Sunni majority to reassure Alawites and other minorities like Christians,Druse and Shiites who believe they need the regimes protection that they will not be subjected to acts of vengeance. These Sunni religious and political leaders can save Syria from its sectarian demons.
Only Syrians can initiate this delicate process; foreign governments,whether Arab or Western,have limited roles to play. The Syrian psyche is shaped by memories of foreign interference,something the Assad regime did not invent,but has exploited.
BASSMA KODMANI is executive director of the Arab Reform Initiative
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