Opinion Three into one

The race has pit Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki against former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi. Three blocs are central to Iraqi politics; blocs that cross the sectarian divide and are the first of their kind in Iraq. They mark a move towards a more representative set-up that attempts to satisfy the three core ethnic groups in the Iraqi political landscape.

There are the Sunnis,who are largely allied with Ayad Allawi’s Al-Iraqiya List. Allawi,a former member of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath Party,has campaigned on a stridently secular platform. In fact his decision to ally with current Vice President Tareq al-Hashimi,a Sunni,is to ensure more Sunni votes,and to beef up his secular credentials. Al-Maliki’s prominence and the rise of Al-Iraqiya indicate Iraqi frustration with religious politics and parties — a staple since the 2003 invasion. Al-Iraqiya enjoys support in Baghdad and the western provinces.

Then there are the Kurds. The Kurds have traditionally voted for their own parties from the autonomous regions in Iraq’s three northern provinces. (Their flag-bearer is the current President Jalal Talabani.) The vote has gone en bloc to an alliance between the two major parties — the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). However,this election season the Kurdish alliance faces

internal challenges through the arrival of the newcomer,the Goran party. Kurds have 53 seats allocated to them in the parliament; however,with Goran on the scene,the Kurds have for the first time the option of choice between competing parties. Goran’s USP is vociferous opposition to corruption in Kurdish politics.

The Kurds have the capacity to swing the election. If one looks at their performance in past elections,the Kurdish bloc has tended to side with PM al-Maliki. Another positive development (similar to Sunni participation in elections) has been the participation of Kirkuk’s Arabs. Kurds have traditionally separated from mainstream Iraqi politics on the issue of oil-rich Kirkuk; their participation in elections this time indicates the will to solve the Kirkuk issue through politics.

The Shia bloc has aligned itself with al-Maliki’s State of Law Coalition. He has the advantages of incumbency with him; but his tenure has produced mixed results. It was al-Maliki’s decision to pair with the US to battle the militias and rout out the insurgency in southern Iraq and Baghdad. Therefore,he is widely credited with increasing stability. However,he has angered his main allies,notably anti-American cleric Moqtada al-Sadr by routing the al-Sadr militias out of oil-rich Basra. What’s more,he broke off traditional Shia alliances and has paired up with Sunni tribal power-brokers. His support comes mainly from southern Iraq.

As it stands these alliances are poised to get even more complex. The Iraqi constitution stipulates that the new parliament must appoint a new president (under Articles 69 and 78). The March 7 elections also end the “transitional phase” of the Iraqi constitution. A key component of the transitional phase was the presidential council — with three members,representing Sunnis,Shias and Kurds. It had the authority to send legislation to parliament three times in order to reach consensus. This set-up will change with the appointment of the new president. The incumbent will have more powers,including that of appointing the PM.

The elections have thus made the process more competitive. As noted by Ali Kareem,an analyst with the Institute of War and Peace and CFR fellow Bernard Gwertzman,should no alliance claim an outright majority in parliament,the president will be elected by a simple majority of votes in the house,as opposed to a two-thirds majority. Thus the formation of parliament will see intense political horse-trading,with each bloc vying for as much control as possible. This is how they will ensure a greater voice in both the appointment of Iraq’s next president and politics.

The US plans to withdraw from Iraq starting August 2010. The first round of parliamentary elections in 2005 saw a five-month period of deliberation and a vacuum in leadership. Iraq can’t afford something similar this time round.

alia.allana@expressindia.com