Opinion The second succession

A supremely important difference was that in 1964,the seamless succession was settled by consensus,ascertained by Kamaraj. This was ruled out in 1966. For,Morarji Desai — who had grumbled bitterly on the previous occasion that he was “outmanoeuvred” by the powerful party bosses and thus “cheated out of what was rightfully his” — made it crystal clear that he would contest for the leadership. At the same time,he insisted that there should be a free and secret ballot by the Congress Parliamentary Party without any “interference” by organisational bosses or state chief ministers. All concerned promptly accepted the inevitability of a secret ballot by the CPP. But they tersely told Desai that the Congress’s “Grand Council”,consisting of the Congress Working Committee,of which all top Central ministers were members,and state chief ministers,all of whom were then Congressmen of substance,had an equal stake in the choice of the new PM,as was underscored in 1964.

Yet another new element in the situation that some considered bizarre was that caretaker PM G.L. Nanda had decided to throw his hat,or rather Gandhi cap,in the ring. On the morning of January 11,even before the plane carrying Shastri’s body had left Tashkent,Nanda went to see Indira Gandhi and asked her whether she wanted to be PM. As was her wont,she disavowed any such ambition. Whereupon,he inquired whether she would support his candidature. Her carefully worded reply was that if all others supported him,she wouldn’t “stand in his way”. Nanda interpreted it as her unconditional support. From there he went to Kamaraj and told him that he was tired of being a “stepney” PM again and again and should therefore be “confirmed” in the top job.

However,realising his limitations,he also spelled out a fall back position: let him be PM for a year until the 1967 general election. “Thereafter you can chuck me out if you so want.” He added that the only Congress leader he would agree to serve under was Indira Gandhi. The silent,strong man from the south heard him out and maintained his customary silence.

There is plenty of evidence to show that as he took the first available plane to Delhi from what was then Madras after hearing the tragic news,Kamaraj had virtually made up his mind that in the transition during difficult times,Indira Gandhi would be the best bet for the Congress and the country. The next election,the first without Nehru,was only 13 months away. No other rival had even a fraction of her appeal to the voters,partly by virtue of being Nehru’s daughter. Moreover,she was above all divisions — religious,regional or caste. Most importantly,she would almost certainly defeat Desai,an objective on which all members of the Syndicate were agreed,whatever else they differed on.

Even so,Kamaraj knew that some of his cohorts would have reservations about Indira Gandhi. These,he discovered,were stronger than he had anticipated. Two very influential members of the Syndicate,S.K. Patil and Atulya Ghosh,for instance,insisted that Kamaraj should take over the responsibility himself. His rather belated reply to them was vintage Kamaraj: “No Hindi,No English. How?” They both then argued that in that case,Nanda should continue as PM “at least for the present”.

This,however,was only one of the numerous ideas floating around at that time. Like Kamaraj,all Congress leaders scattered across the country had rushed to Delhi ostensibly for Shastri’s funeral,but actually for their own or factional pursuits. Immediately after the funeral,the posture of restraint had yielded place to no-holds-barred struggle. Remarkably,Congress MPs from Hindi-speaking states made it known that they would not allow the office of PM to go out of their domain,considering that President S. Radhakrishan and Congress president Kamaraj were both south Indians.

Desai,needless to add,was a Gujarati but few expected him to win. This clearly tipped the scales in Indira Gandhi’s favour but she wisely maintained that she would go by the Congress president’s advice and would favour “near-unanimity” — which meant all others except Desai.

However,things did not move towards a decision because fluid and often fatuous discussions were unending. So much so that,at a meeting of the CWC,or rather the much wider “Grand Council” on January 14,the only decision taken was that the leader of the CPP would be elected on January 19.

The next day,however,the logjam was broken,not by the Syndicate that still lacked agreement,but by chief ministers. Madhya Pradesh CM D.P. Mishra (Indira Gandhi’s confidant for many years who,like others,eventually fell from grace),called a meeting of eight CMs who unanimously resolved that Indira Gandhi should be the next PM. By nightfall,the Indira bandwagon had turned into a juggernaut. All other CMs and several Central ministers had rallied round her.

No wonder then that on the appointed day,Indira Gandhi was elected with a comfortable majority of 355 to 169. Desai dubbed it as the “victory of the pack”. But the jubilation of the huge crowd that had surrounded Parliament knew no limit. Her car just could not reach her. So a Cadillac-owning operator drove her to Rashtrapati Bhavan at a snail’s pace. From there she returned home in a presidential limousine. There,too,her assembled admirers and even her staff were busy lustily cheering her to the sky. She watched the scene for a while and then said softly: “Will someone please give me a glass of water?”

The writer is a Delhi-based political commentator