There is little doubt that Thais like the idea of democracy. They have been fighting for it on and off since 1932,when absolute monarchy was overthrown. Most Thais will vote on July 3 for the third time in six years. Campaigning is feverish,posters omnipresent and a raucous media offer endless news,comment and speculation.
Yet this election is about Thailands repeated failure to agree on what constitutes democracy and on how democracy fits with the older institutions themonarchy,the military and the centralised bureaucracy. Those failures have been seen in the cycle of elections and coups that has repeated itself since the 1973 overthrow of the Thanom Kittikachorn dictatorship.
The second is a broad generational change that manifests itself in different ways. Wealth gaps are getting wider but there is no shortage of work; Thailand now relies on about three million foreign workers to do its dirtiest jobs. Political awareness has increased thanks to education and the ubiquitous media creating a feeling among many Thais,particularly in the lower income groups,that they are not getting a fair share of the cake. Generational change also affects views of the role of the old institutions.
For Thaksins defenders the problem has been the unwillingness of the military and monarchists to accept democracy: Thaksin was overthrown,the constitution was changed,and many Thaksin supporters believe the judiciary was manipulated. They see the incumbent prime minister,Abhisit Vejjajiva of the Democrat Party,as a front for conservative forces that want a veto over who is prime minister,and,as in Bangkok last spring,is willing to use violence against peaceful demonstrators.
The anti-Thaksin forces accuse him,with some reason,of abusing his power in office for personal and political gain,and undermining the institutions and checks and balances built into the 1997 constitution then viewed as a democratic model. Less convincingly,Thaksins opponents also accuse him of fomenting antimonarchist sentiment and threatening economic stability through populist spending.
So the country has two choices. An Abhisit government that has proven competent but owes its existence to the military and is viewed by many to represent a self-interested elite,a choice that risks a backlash in the streets. Or,a return to the Thaksin camp,a choice that risks a possible military crackdown.
This being Thailand some kind of deal is always possible,even one that allows for the eventual return and pardon of Thaksin. Money speaks loudly in Thai politics,and big business,though tending to be critical of Thaksin,is more concerned with avoiding political mayhem.
Given the passions that Thaksin arouses and that the king is no longer seen as peacemaker,finding a liberal and democratic way forward will not be easy. Neither Thaksin nor his military and monarchist enemies are at ease with the freedoms,rules and compromises necessary for democratic politics. But most Thais are,which suggests that the election will neither resolve nor worsen the tensions arising from economic success and social change. Philip Bowring
